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Abstract
Th is study examines the economic and social impacts of the trade liberalization aspects of the proposed 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the European Union (EU) and African countries. 
It provides a quantitative assessment of the likely implications of EPAs establishing Free Trade Areas 
(FTAs) between the EU and the various African Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Th e focus of 
the empirical analysis is on the trade liberalization component of the EPAs. In particular, the following 
questions are addressed. First, how will an EPA that includes reciprocal market access agreements between 
the EU and Africa impact on African countries’ GDPs, levels of employment and other macroeconomic 
aggregates? Second, what sectors in Africa are most likely to lose and what sectors gain with EPAs? Th ird, 
what are the welfare implications for African countries from the EPAs? Fourth, how will the formation 
of EPAs aﬀ ect trade expansion through trade creation and trade diversion eﬀ ects? Fifth, what are the 
potential ﬁ scal implications of the EPAs?
Th e main conclusions drawn from the results and the discussions are that full reciprocity will be very 
costly for Africa irrespective of how the issue is looked at. A focus on deepening integration with a view to 
enhancing intra-African trade would provide positive results. But it is the scenario that oﬀ ers unrestricted 
market access for Africa, which deals eﬀ ectively with barriers associated with sensitive European products, 
that portends the largest gain for the continent. Even with reciprocity, a free trade area that includes 
sectors of export interest to Africa and one that deals with non-tariﬀ  barriers promises positive results for 
African countries.
Material from this publication may be freely quoted or reprinted. Acknowledgement is requested, together with a copy of the 
publication  Th e views expressed are those of its authors and do not necessarily reﬂ ect those of the United Nations.
Th is publication was produced with the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
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Executive Summary
Th e principles and challenges of the proposed Economic Partnership Agreements
Th e Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) between the European Union (EU) and African, Caribbean 
and Paciﬁ c (ACP) countries is expected to succeed the expired Lomé Agreement. It envisages the signing 
of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) by December 2007 between the EU and the ACP countries. 
Th e EPAs, which will be the new cooperative framework under the CPA, are expected to adopt an 
integrated approach based on partnership, cooperation, trade and political dialogue between the EU 
and ACP countries. One of the essential characteristics of this multilateral partnership is that it hopes to 
combine responses to the challenge of globalization and the development aid essential to ACP countries; 
with a strengthened political dimension. Th e key CPA principles are reciprocity, diﬀ erentiation, deeper 
regional integration, and coordination of trade and aid.
Any beneﬁ ts that EPAs are expected to generate for ACP countries are unlikely to materialize spontaneously 
or instantaneously. Moreover, the implementation of EPAs will impose a number of severe challenges for 
ACP countries that include: how to manage the expected losses of ﬁ scal revenue in some ACP countries; 
how to cope with more competition expected to be entailed under the EPAs principle of reciprocity; how 
to ascertain net beneﬁ ts from the EPAs, especially in LDCs, that is, incentive compatibility between EPAs 
and the EBA provisions that do not require reciprocity; how to deal with limited negotiations capacity 
because EPAs negotiations will stretch the already limited resources available to the ACP countries; and 
how to ensure consistency between the negotiations under the EPAs and that under the Doha Work 
Programme, in particular, how to improve market access for agricultural and non-agricultural products 
that continue to impose diﬃ  culties in trade negotiations at the multilateral level.
Some questions arising from the trade related aspects of EPAs
Th e focus of this study is to quantify the economic and social impacts of the trade liberalization aspects 
of the proposed EPAs. More precisely, the study seeks to provide a quantitative assessment of the likely 
implications of the implementation of the EPAs establishing Free Trade Areas (FTAs) between EU and 
the various Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Th e focus of the empirical analysis is on the trade 
liberalization component of the EPAs. In particular, the following questions are addressed. First, how 
are African countries likely to gain or lose as evidenced by the impacts on GDP, employment and other 
macroeconomic aggregates from a bilateral trade liberalization between Africa and the EU as governed 
by the EPAs reciprocity principle? Second, what sectors in Africa are most likely to lose and what sectors 
gain with EPAs. And based on the empirical evidence on the industry structure likely to result under 
the EPAs, would application of the asymmetry principle in the EPAs provide suﬃ  cient lead-time for the 
viii
nascent manufacturing sectors in African economies? Th ird, what are the welfare implications for the 
African countries from the EPAs? Fourth, how will the formation of EPAs aﬀ ect trade expansion through 
trade creation and trade diversion eﬀ ects? Fifth, what are the potential ﬁ scal implications of the EPAs?
Methodological approaches to analysing the potential EPAs impacts
Trade policy analysis such as that required in the evaluation of the potential impacts of EPAs largely 
involves analysing implications of trade policy instruments on the production structure in economies 
at the national and global level. Trade policy instruments such as tariﬀ s and quotas have direct and 
indirect eﬀ ects on the relative prices of commodities produced in a given country. As the mix of goods 
and services produced change, the demands for factors of production also change. Consequently, in any 
given economy, it is diﬃ  cult to conceive a situation where the change in trade policy would aﬀ ect only 
one sector. Due to the forward and backward linkages and their related strengths existing in a particular 
economy, the result is always one in which the relative mix of sectoral outputs change. Th is by extension 
aﬀ ects the relative mix of the diﬀ erent factors of production in the diﬀ erent sectors. 
Th e country-level eﬀ ects on output mix and demands for factors of production can in the context of 
international trade be extended to the global economy. Changes in relative prices of outputs and inputs 
resulting in a given country’s change in trade policy are transmitted to the industries and input markets of 
other economies that the country trades with. Th erefore, for trade policy analysis to be meaningful and for 
robust results to be produced, the interactions that prevail among diﬀ erent sectors as a result of a change 
in a given or group of countries trade policy instruments must be taken into account. Since, the EPAs 
will potentially have these kind of impacts, the general equilibrium methodology presented itself as the 
most appropriate analytical framework that would allow the inter- and intra-sectoral changes in output 
mix and by extension the demand for diﬀ erent factors of production to be captured. In this respect, this 
study utilises the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model and database to investigate the potential 
implications of the EPAs on sub-Saharan Africa. But, this model could only allow the assessment of the 
EPAs at the continental level through a hypothetical SSA-EU EPA due to data limitation with respect to 
representation of African countries in the GTAP database as stand-alone regions.
It was therefore necessary to look for an alternative methodology that would allow analysis at the country 
level and also at HS 6-digit level of products classiﬁ cation. Th e study found it necessary to consider a 
partial equilibrium methodology, in spite of its weakness of ignoring sectoral and regional feedbacks 
when trade policy instruments are changed either in a given sector or all sectors in a given country. 
However, given its capacity to allow analysis at high level of disaggregation, the partial equilibrium 
models become indispensable especially because of the interest to establish sensitive sectors either with 
regards to industrial or ﬁ scal policies. Th e World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS/SMART) model was 
chosen as the applied partial equilibrium framework. Th e WITS/SMART model brings together various 
databases ranging from bilateral trade, commodity trade ﬂ ows and various levels and types of protection. 
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WITS also integrate analytical tools that support simulation analysis. Th e SMART simulation model 
is one of the analytical tools in WITS for simulation purposes. SMART contains in-built analytical 
modules that support trade policy analysis such as eﬀ ects of multilateral tariﬀ  cuts, preferential trade 
liberalization and ad hoc tariﬀ  changes. Th e underlying theory behind this analytical tool is the standard 
partial equilibrium framework that considers dynamic eﬀ ects constant. Like any partial equilibrium 
model, it has these strong assumptions allowing the trade policy analysis to be undertaken a country at a 
time. In spite of this weakness, WITS/SMART helped to estimate trade creation, diversion, welfare and 
revenue eﬀ ects for those countries whose data is available.
Th e empirical scenarios
In the case of the general equilibrium results, it was necessary to reﬂ ect a realistic benchmark for the 
EPAs given that they are expected to come into force beginning 1 January 2008 when other events with 
implications to the international trade landscape will have taken place. Th e main events that will precede 
the launch of the EPAs and hence likely to aﬀ ect how they impact on the economies and welfare of sub-
Sahara Africa include the following: the enlargement of the European Union; the implementation of the 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing as part of the MFA phase out; the implementation of the Uruguay 
Round Agreement on domestic support and export subsidies; the full accession of China into the WTO; 
and the conclusion of the Doha Development Round. Th e Doha Round outcome is currently not clear 
how it will likely impact on the EPAs. Th erefore, it has not been built into the baseline of the EPAs as 
yet, but the other four events were built into the baseline.
With the baseline in place, three scenarios were designed to help unravel some of the impacts that the 
EPAs are likely to have on sub-Saharan Africa economies. Th e ﬁ rst scenario looked at full reciprocity by 
SSA countries to EU preferences without addressing the sensitivities that currently exist on the part of 
the EU for some of the sectors. Essentially, the tariﬀ s faced by the EU in Africa were equated to the low 
tariﬀ s that SSA products face in the EU market. In the second scenario, a benevolent stance by the EU was 
assumed that would accept an EPAs that front-loads in the ﬁ rst phase the dismantling of tariﬀ s and other 
barriers within SSA in line with the principle of deepening regional integration in Africa as captured in the 
Cotonou Partnership Agreement. Th is scenario was further motivated by the desire to increase the market 
size within SSA that would support the development of competitive industries driven by economies of 
scale. Th e third scenario considered the ultimate goal of the EPAs, the establishment of free trade area 
between the EU and SSA. Essentially, full trade liberalization is undertaken between the EU and SSA and 
the sensitive markets in the EU are opened up for the SSA producers and exporters and vice-versa.
In the case of the partial equilibrium analysis, unlike the general equilibrium analysis where it was 
possible to look at several scenarios, only one simulation was undertaken for each country with the partial 
model. Th is scenario looks only at the reciprocity principal. Due to the weaknesses already pointed out 
especially the ceteris paribus assumption upon which this model operates; only one-way liberalization is 
xpossible. Th e scenario indicates the possible outcomes of reducing to zero the import duties that the SSA 
countries impose on EU goods. As already noted, one special advantage of the WITS/SMART model 
is that it allowed the analysis to be undertaken at the 6-digit level. Th ere was therefore no aggregation 
problem such as the one with the GTAP database.  Th e transmission mechanism for the trade eﬀ ects in 
the partial equilibrium model is simple: the elimination of existing tariﬀ s on EU imports reduces the 
prices that consumers in the importing African country face compared to domestic substitutes and the 
responsiveness of demand to the price change inﬂ uences the amount of trade created or diverted. Th e 
substitutability of the EU goods for domestic goods is implicitly assumed. Th e Armington assumption 
at HS 6-digit level is that goods imported from diﬀ erent countries are imperfect substitutes. It is also 
assumed that the supply response to the price reduction will allow the EU producers and exporters to 
meet any demand arising in the importing countries as a result of price reduction. Th at is, export supplies 
are perfectly elastic which means that world supplies of each variety of the goods by origin are given.
Th e main ﬁ ndings
Th e main conclusions that can be drawn from the results and the discussion are that full reciprocity will 
be very costly for Africa irrespective of how the issue is looked at. A focus on deepening integration with a 
view to enhancing intra-African trade would provide positive results. But it is the scenario for unrestricted 
market access for Africa, which deals eﬀ ectively with barriers associated to sensitive European products, 
that portends the largest gain for the continent. Even with reciprocity, a free trade area that does not 
exclude sectors of export interest to Africa and one that deals with non-tariﬀ  barriers promises positive 
results for African countries. 
Based on the magnitudes and direction of impacts under the three scenarios, the overarching conclusion 
from the ﬁ ndings is that sequencing of policy reforms that Africa will need to undertake is critical to 
the success of the EPAs. To begin with, the EPAs should focus on deepening intra-African trade. Th is 
should be given suﬃ  cient lead-time to allow African countries to build the requisite competitiveness. 
Th is would have to be accompanied with signiﬁ cant developmental programmes to complement the 
larger markets with increased supply and diversiﬁ ed capacities. Eventually, any tariﬀ  dismantlement by 
African countries will need to be implemented in phases, hand in hand with unrestricted market access 
for the African exports into the EU market. Clearly, the 10-12 years period interpreted from Article 
XXIV of GATT is only suﬃ  cient for the deepening of  intra-African trade. Th e EPAs should look beyond 
12 years as the possible dates for introducing reciprocity. Before then, unrestricted market access and 
deeper African integration will have provided suﬃ  cient room for supply capacities and exports diversity 
to be built on the continent.
Th e adjustment costs at the country level and the dangers to the regional integration processes on the 
continent emerged also as potential challenges for the EPAs. Two consistent stories underpin these 
concerns. Th e ﬁ rst consistent outcome in each of the proposed EPA at the regional economic community 
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(REC) level is that EU stands to gain signiﬁ cantly in terms of expanded trade into RECs markets. 
While part of this trade expansion will result from trade creation, which is welfare improving, signiﬁ cant 
proportions of the trade gain will also be due to trade diversion from the rest of the world and from within 
the REC EPA grouping itself. As a result, while the reciprocity principle appears to be trade expanding, it 
will pose serious implications for deepened regional integration in Africa. In deed, unless there are clear 
mitigating measures, the EPAs could seriously undermine the gains that have been achieved so far in the 
integration process of the continent. 
Another consistent result at the country and regional level, are the potential adjustment costs that African 
countries will have to bear as a result of revenue shortfalls. Given the prominence of EU imports into these 
countries and the reliance of majority of African countries on tariﬀ  revenues, the tariﬀ  dismantlement 
result, in all cases, in signiﬁ cant revenue shortfalls. It is only in the SACU countries where tariﬀ  losses 
appear limited and even then, the revenues sharing formula within SACU is likely to ameliorate any 
shocks from the EPAs in those countries. Th e major challenge that these revenue shortfalls will pose is 
the adjustment costs associated with tax policy and administration reforms. Th e EPAs, if no appropriate 
measures are put in place to forestall the macroeconomic imbalances that are likely to result from falling 
revenues, could possibly undermine developmental objectives of African countries.

1Introduction
Background
Th e Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) between the European Union (EU) and the African, 
Caribbean and Paciﬁ c (ACP) countries expected to succeed the expired Lomé Agreement, envisages 
the signing of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) by December 2007 between the EU and ACP 
countries. Th e EPAs will be the new cooperative framework under the CPA and are expected to adopt 
an integrated approach based on partnership and promoting cooperation, trade and political dialogue 
between the EU and ACP countries. One of the essential characteristics of this multilateral partnership is 
that it hopes to combine trade (to respond to the challenge of globalization), development aid (essential 
to ACP countries), and a strengthened political dimension.  Th e key CPA principles are reciprocity; 
diﬀ erentiation; deeper regional integration; and coordination of trade and aid.
Th e EPAs, which are to be CPA development vehicles will address trade barriers, supply-side constraints 
in ACP countries, and World Trade Organisation (WTO) compatibility question. EPAs will essentially be 
Free Trade Area (FTA) arrangements to replace the non-reciprocal trading preferences currently advanced 
to the ACP countries under the Lomé Agreement with reciprocal arrangements in compliance to the 
WTO rules of non-discriminatory trading arrangements. 
Ideally, in order for the ACP-EU arrangements to be WTO-compatible, the EU would be expected to 
advance similar preferences to non-ACP countries that are at the same level of development just as the ones 
being enjoyed by ACP countries. Th us, unless the EU is willing to extend similar preferences to both ACP 
and non-ACP countries, then in order not to be challenged on the grounds of discrimination under the 
most favoured nation (MFN) clause of the WTO, ACP countries under the EPAs will be expected to grant 
EU originating imports of goods duty free access into their markets. Th is will be similar duty free access 
granted by the EU on selected goods from those countries under the expired Lomé Agreement. 
However, the EU can still unilaterally establish a non-reciprocal preference system that favours developing 
countries and still remain WTO compliant. Th e Everything-But-Arms (EBA) initiative is one such 
arrangement granted under the enabling clauses of the GATT/WTO rules that allows developed countries 
to have favourable preference systems for developing countries without reciprocity. Th e EBA grants duty-
free access to all imports from developing countries that meet the least developed countries criteria. Th e 
critical diﬀ erence between the EBA initiative and the EPAs in terms of trade is that the EBA initiative is 
non-discriminatory as its preferences are accessible globally to all least developed countries (LDCs) at the 
same level of development while the EPAs are just for ACP countries. Further, EPAs envisage a wider level 
of cooperation other than just trade.
2Th e interim period between the signing of the CPA on 23 June 2000 and the launch of the EPAs by 1 
January 2008 is supposed to be the time for the negotiation process about the ﬁ nal form and undertakings 
in the respective EPAs. Th ere are two phases in the negotiation process. Th e ﬁ rst phase was launched on 
27 September 2002 and has been concluded without any bindings as sought by the ACP countries. 
During phase I of the negotiation process, the CPA presupposed that ACP member countries will self-
determine an appropriate regional trading arrangement, preferably a regional economic community 
(REC) under which to negotiate with the EU for a new EPA. Th e REC could either be a free trade area 
(FTA) or a customs union (CU). EU’s preference for RECs in the negotiations can be seen to be justiﬁ ed 
under its stated objective of wishing to use the EPAs in the CPA to deepen the regional integration 
processes in the ACP countries. Deeper regional integration it is hoped will eventually facilitate the 
maximization of these countries gains from the multilateral trade liberalization and globalization. 
Th ere are two issues that emerge as a result of the requirement for the ACP countries to determine 
the conﬁ guration within which they will negotiate the EPAs. Th e ﬁ rst issue relates to the ratiﬁ cation 
of the agreed EPA. It is still not clear whether the EPAs will be ratiﬁ ed at the national or RECs level. 
Depending on how the ratiﬁ cation is handled, it is possible that in some cases, rather than deepen 
integration, EPAs could also introduce unnecessary tensions in the RECs. Th e second issue relates 
to the rationalization of the multiple RECs especially in Africa. By indicating a preference for EPAs 
negotiations with RECs rather than individual countries, the EU could be ‘forcing’ some rationalization 
of RECs, which is a major political issue at the moment.
Th e ACP countries expectations under phase I were actually not met since their desire to have a binding 
common framework from this phase of the negotiations was not attained. Instead, the framework for 
negotiation of ACP-wide issues remained unresolved. Th e following key issues remain which the RECs 
will now have to deal with independently of each other: compatibility with the WTO rules; treatment of 
non-LDCS at the expiry of the Cotonou Agreement if the EPAs are not concluded; liberalization of rules of 
origin; technical barriers to trade and the sanitary and phyto-sanitary issues; safeguards, anti-dumping, and 
dispute settlement; EU-ACP existing commodity protocols; economic and social implications of the EPAs; 
and the EPAs implementation mechanisms. Th e outcome of the negotiations on these issues will depend 
largely on the negotiating ability and capacity of the parties involved. It is common knowledge however that 
the EU possesses an overwhelming advantage over African RECs on negotiations.
Th e second phase negotiations now being undertaken on regional basis, began on October 2003 with 
EPA negotiations for Western and Central African regions under ECOWAS and CEMAC respectively. 
Th e negotiations for Eastern and Southern Africa region and those spearheaded by Southern African 
Development Cooperation (SADC) were later launched in the ﬁ rst half of 2004. Any beneﬁ ts that EPAs 
are expected to generate for ACP countries are unlikely to materialise spontaneously or instantaneously. 
Moreover, the implementation of EPAs will likrly impose a number of severe challenges for ACP countries 
that include: 
3(a) How to manage the expected losses of ﬁ scal revenue in some ACP countries;
(b) How to cope with more competition expected to arise due to the principle of reciprocity of the 
EPAs;
(c) How to ascertain net beneﬁ ts from the EPAs, especially in LDCs, that is, incentive compatibility 
between EPAs and the EBA provisions that do not require reciprocity;
(d) How to deal with limited negotiations capacity because EPAs negotiations will stretch the already 
limited resources available to the ACP countries;
(e) How to ensure consistency between the negotiations under the EPAs and that under the Doha Work 
Programme (DWP), in particular, how to improve market access for agricultural and non-agricultural 
products that continue to impose diﬃ  culties in trade negotiations at the multilateral level.
Given this background, this study provides an in-depth analytical work, among other things, aimed at 
informing African member States and RECs to ensure maximum beneﬁ ts from the new cooperating 
framework. Th is study is therefore designed to contribute analytical work towards seeking ways for 
maximizing gains for Africa from the EPAs. Moreover, the study hopes to play a crucial role as an 
indispensable building block for eliciting common negotiating positions of Africa both at sub-regional 
and regional level as the EPA negotiations pick momentum. While the study aims to contribute to 
eﬀ ective participation of African countries in the new ACP-EU framework, it also hopes to play a part in 
expediting Africa’s participation in the EPAs trade negotiations. 
Why a Quantitative Assessment of the EPAs Principles is Important
As can be seen from the background, there are many questions that arise. Th e focus of this study will 
be to quantify the economic and social impacts of the trade liberalization aspects of the proposed 
EPAs. More precisely, the study will provide a quantitative assessment of the likely implications of 
the implementation of the EPAs establishing FTAs between EU and the various RECs. Th e study will 
aim to provide suggestions to some speciﬁ c issues, which African negotiators must deal with in the 
negotiations with their EU counterparts on the form and nature of the respective EPAs within the 
diﬀ erent RECs. Th e issues are particularly of concern to policymakers in Africa as they are faced with 
the challenge of ensuring that the outcomes of the EPAs will be beneﬁ cial to the people of Africa, and 
will have positive returns for any sacriﬁ ces that Africa will have to make under the EPAs. It is expected 
that EPAs results will have to be better than the outcomes of the expired Lomé Convention, which is 
widely argued in the literature to have been sub-optimal. 
4One challenge that studies such as this have to deal with is the multiplicity of RECs in sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA). According to the CPA, it is expected that individual African countries will self-determine 
under which REC they will wish to negotiate for an EPA with the EU. Initially, this self-determination 
of membership to RECs was complicated by two current factors. First, most countries in SSA are 
members of more than one REC. As a result, there was the initial diﬃ  culty of rationalizing the RECs 
deﬁ nition for the purposes of the EPAs negotiations. Second, under the CPA country nomenclature, 
some African countries are identiﬁ ed as LDCs, while others are non-LDCs. Within the existing RECs, 
some members are LDCs while others are non-LDCs. In which case, the LDCs may not be under 
pressure to conclude an EPA by December 2007 since come 1 January 2008, they will still be able 
to enjoy non-reciprocal preferences for their exports to the EU through the EBA initiative. However 
EBA does not involve aid, which means they need to weigh the beneﬁ ts and costs of increased trade 
possibilities against the loss of aid.
For the purposes of this study, three propositions have been made to justify the empirical analysis. 
Firstly, it is proposed that it is in the interest of all SSA countries including LDCs1 that beneﬁ t from 
EBA to wish to see EPAs concluded in which they are members. Th e reason behind this proposition is 
that unlike EBA initiative which mainly focuses on trade aspects, the EPAs are an integrated framework 
which have development aid component which countries may not wish to lose out on, particularly the 
elements that deal with addressing supply-side constraints of the ACP countries. Th e EBA initiative 
does not commit to address the supply-side issues2 that saw the ACP countries being unable to exploit 
the preferences granted to them under the Lomé Agreement. Th us, there are potentially additional 
signiﬁ cant developmental gains from the EPAs likely to be inbuilt in the ﬁ nancial and technical 
cooperation component of the EPAs. 
Th e second proposition is that under the EPA negotiations, agreement is likely to be reached on issues 
that are of interest even to LDCs. Th ere is scope under EPAs for agreements in areas such as the EU 
commodity protocols on bananas, rice and sugar that LDCs might also be interested in. Other areas 
include reduction in agricultural export and production subsidies; more liberal rules of origin compared 
to those under EBA; and ﬁ nancial support to deal with revenue loses due to trade liberalization. 
Th e third proposition is now a moot point, but it is in respect of RECs rationalization. It was proposed 
that once both LDCs and non-LDC countries in SSA accepted that there was merit beyond trade 
in concluding EPAs then geographical proximity was going to provide an acceptable criterion for 
determining the member country composition of the RECs to negotiate with the EU. Th is study 
carries out quantitative analysis of the social and economic impacts of the EPAs at the following 
regional levels, with each region representing a REC: East and Southern Africa; Southern Africa; 
Central Africa; and Western Africa. 
5Scope of Quantitative Inquiry into the EPAs
Th e preceding section has outlined the broad issues addressed in this study. Th is sub-section details the 
speciﬁ c questions that the study sought to provide empirical suggestions on. Th e focus of the empirical 
analysis is on the trade liberalization component of the EPAs. In particular, the following questions 
are addressed. 
First, how are African countries likely to gain or lose as evidenced by the impacts on GDP, employment 
and other macroeconomic aggregates from a bilateral trade liberalization between Africa and the EU as 
governed by the EPAs reciprocity principle? 
Second, what sectors in Africa are most likely to lose and what sectors gain in the EPA. And based 
on the empirical evidence on the industry structure likely to result under the EPAs, what can be said 
regarding the phasing in process of trade liberalization for goods from the EU? Would application of the 
asymmetry principle in the EPAs provide suﬃ  cient lead-time for the nascent manufacturing sectors in 
African economies? Article XXIV of the WTO under which the EPAs will be negotiated, requires that any 
FTAs formed liberalize “substantially all trade” (which has been interpreted to mean at least 90 percent 
of the intra-FTA member countries trade) and this has to be done within a reasonable amount of time 
(interpreted to imply 10 years or so). Th is study will seek to provide empirical evidence as to whether 
the 90 percent intra-regional bloc trade liberalization for African EPAs is a reasonable proposition and 
whether the 10 years suggested for this to take place is suﬃ  cient3.
Th ird, what are the welfare implications for African countries from the EPAs? And what does this 
portend for the need to have compensatory funds over and above the existing but unutilised European 
Development Fund (EDF). Th e welfare implications analysis combined with the potential changes in 
the economic structure provide the basis for investigating what it means to have preferential elimination 
of SSA tariﬀ s on imports from the EU on the basis of sensitive sectors. Th e issue of which sectors are 
exempted from preferential trade liberalization in the EPAs was seen to be important as it ﬁ tted within 
the infant industry argument that some SSA countries would like to see develop. By linking the welfare 
implications to the sectors exempted from the preferential liberalization it was possible to determine 
which sectors are most likely to lead to pro-development outcomes and which should not be exempted 
as that would simply be pandering to protectionist interests. 
Fourth, how will the formation of EPAs aﬀ ect trade expansion through trade creation and trade diversion 
eﬀ ects? Critics and those sceptical of the EPAs could argue that they have the possibility of causing 
signiﬁ cant trade diversion. As a result, proposals have even been made for the need to have SSA countries 
reduce their applied MFN tariﬀ s concomitantly with their bilateral reduction of tariﬀ s for EU imports. 
Th is study quantiﬁ es the trade expansion eﬀ ects of the reduction of tariﬀ s faced by the EU under the 
6EPA. Th is analysis provides sort of ex ante counterfactual evidence of what it means for SSA countries 
to ensure consistency between the tariﬀ  reductions related to the EPAs and those that may be agreed 
at the conclusion of the Doha round of trade negotiations. Th e World Bank has suggested that a pro-
development outcome of the Doha round would need to achieve average tariﬀ s of ﬁ ve percent for 
manufacturing, with a maximum of 10 percent and an average of 10 percent for agriculture, with a 
maximum of 15 percent (World Bank 2003).
Fifth, the ﬁ scal implications of the EPAs are seen to be one of the key negotiation issues. Indeed, 
the development aid component of the CPA in addition to addressing the supply-side constraints of 
production in ACP countries is also predicated on the expected loss of revenue. Th ere are two ways that 
the loss in revenue has been shown to occur in this study. First is a direct eﬀ ect due to the zero rating of 
imports from the EU. Th e second eﬀ ect is through trade diversion eﬀ ects, which lead to further losses in 
revenue. Consequently, this study quantiﬁ es the direct revenue implications under each of the EPAs for 
the REC member countries. Th e quantiﬁ cation of the trade expansion has provided a basis for estimating 
the revenue eﬀ ects resulting due to trade diversion from non-EU to EU producers and suppliers.
Empirical Tools for EPAs Analysis
Trade issues by nature require an analytical framework that allows a holistic view of world economies. 
Th is is not only because of the inter-linkages between various sectors in any given economy but also 
because of the relationships between sectors in one economy to the rest of the world economies. Th ese 
national, regional and global linkages may occur either in the inputs or products markets or as are usually 
the case, in both. Th erefore, in order to avoid ignoring these linkages, a general equilibrium methodology 
such as one using the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model (to be discussed in details in Section 
IV) is one of the analytical instruments be used in this study4. 
Th e GTAP model is a multi-country multi-commodity model that requires data for each and every 
country (see Hertel 1997). However, most African countries, due to their lack of up-to-date input-
output tables, are not included in the GTAP database. Given the challenge that this posed for analysis 
of implications of the EPAs at the level of individual RECs, the study used the limited data available 
to build some scenarios for EU-SSA EPA. Th is approach allowed the potential general equilibrium 
eﬀ ects of the EPAs at the RECs level to be analysed. Th is is a common approach to resolving the 
data limitation issue (see Karingi et al. 2002 and ECA forthcoming). Some parallels could be drawn 
for individual African countries where their economic structure can be distinctively identiﬁ ed. As 
argued in Karingi et al. (2002) in a study of COMESA’s FTA and customs union, an initial look at 
COMESA member countries may show homogenous agricultural economies. However, when the 
countries are closely examined, three heterogeneous groupings of countries emerge as constituting 
COMESA. 
7First group are the purely agricultural economies such as Malawi. Second group comprises economies with 
some signiﬁ cant level of manufacturing base such as Zimbabwe. And the third group are those countries rich 
in mineral resources such as Zambia and Zimbabwe. Th is meant that, through appropriate disaggregation 
of sectors (or commodities) in the GTAP database; these three characteristics could be captured in detail.
In using the GTAP model whose database benchmark is 1997, the study faced the challenge of the 
parallel multilateral negotiations taking place even as the EPAs negotiations proceed. Th is challenge 
was however overcome in the GTAP simulations in the same way that ECA (forthcoming) study on 
agriculture in the Doha Round did.  Essentially, the ECA study simulated the changes that have taken 
or are expected to take place between 1997 and 2005. Th us, a baseline that captured all the Uruguay 
Round commitments, the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy of the EU Agenda 2000, China’s 
WTO accession, the implementation of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing expected in 2005, and 
the EU eastwards enlargement was constructed. Th is study also starts from a baseline that captures these 
important changes expected to precede the inauguration of the EPAs.
Th e revenue implications of the EPAs as already pointed out are major concerns for African countries 
as a majority of them raise a signiﬁ cant proportion of their ordinary revenues from import duties. Th is 
justiﬁ ed the case for the complementary partial equilibrium analysis using trade statistics to shed more 
light on the EPAs possible implications. Tekere and Ndlela (2003) developed scenarios for SADC using 
this methodology (see more details below) to analyse revenue implication for SADC member countries 
of diﬀ erent levels of opening up of trade to EU-sourced imports into SADC.
8Evolution of the EU-ACP Partnership: from Yaoundé through 
Lomé to Cotonou
Th e following section describes how the African Caribbean and Paciﬁ c countries’ partnership with the 
European Union was developed and how it evolved over time to the present constitution of Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs). Th e challenges that EPAs pose to African countries are also reviewed.
Th e Yaoundé Conventions
Since its inception the European Economic Community (EEC) agreed to apply a favourable economic 
treatment to African countries. Th e Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957, founding the EEC, oﬀ ered special 
trade and economic support measures for the oﬀ shore territories and dependent countries of the then 
six EEC member states (Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxemburg, and the 
Netherlands). In 1958, the ﬁ rst European Development Fund (EDF) was set up to ﬁ nance economic and 
social development projects, mostly in then French territories.
Upon their independence, in the early 1960’s, some African countries negotiated with the EEC the 
continuation of their preferential economic relations. Th is gave rise to the beginning of the EU-Africa 
Partnership, under which the European Community (then the European Union) and the group of 
African, later joined by Caribbean and Paciﬁ c countries agreed on a framework of economic, cultural 
and political cooperation. Over time, this Partnership saw its coverage extended both in geographical 
terms and in the number of areas of cooperation covered. Th e accession of the United Kingdom to the 
European Community in 1972 was followed by a signiﬁ cant increase in the number of Member States 
in the ACP group.
Th e African-EC Partnership was launched on a contractual basis by the signing of the ﬁ rst Yaoundé 
Convention in July 1963, between the EEC and 18 African States, mostly francophone countries. 
Th e Convention contained provisions on trade and ﬁ nancial aid. Interestingly, the trade provisions of 
Yaoundé were based on reciprocal and non-discriminatory terms, pursuing the trade arrangements of 
pre-independence time. Such reciprocal arrangement were closer to those of a free trade agreement than 
of a preferential trade scheme5, and as such, more similar to the Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs) currently under negotiations between the EU and ACP states. Agricultural development was 
given a high proﬁ le in the ﬁ rst Yaoundé convention. Th e second Conference of Yaoundé, signed in July 
1969, provided an increase in European Development Fund resources for development projects. It also 
prolonged the reciprocal non-discriminatory trade arrangements. Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda chose to 
join the second Yaoundé Convention.
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Convention, when the ﬁ rst Lomé Convention was signed in February 1975. At this time, the EEC 
had experienced its ﬁ rst major enlargement, with among others the accession of the United Kingdom. 
In this new context, countries that had until then privileged trade relations with Great Britain in the 
Commonwealth were confronted with a shift in paradigm, as their traditional trade partner (the UK) 
overhauled radically its trade framework. Hence, the UK’s accession to the EEC was a strong incentive for 
some Anglophone countries to also engage into a privileged partnership with the EEC. Th e ACP group 
was therefore extended to 46 members, including for the ﬁ rst time, Caribbean and Paciﬁ c nations. 
Th e Lomé Conventions
At its beginning, the Lomé Convention was hailed for its innovativeness and as an exemplary form of 
North-South partnership. With hindsight, however, most commentators now agree that the successive 
Lomé Conventions failed to reach their development objectives and need reforming. Th e ﬁ rst Lomé 
Convention was signed in February 1975. It was characterized by its contractual nature, its partnership 
principle and a combination of aid, trade and political aspects. Th e Lomé Convention was renewed 4 
times, until 2000.
On trade, the Convention proposed a non-reciprocal discriminatory trade agreement between the 
EEC and the ACP group. Th is arrangement was a radical change from the Yaoundé convention, which 
stipulated reciprocal and non-discriminatory trade. Concretely, while the EU was granting a very 
favourable market access to ACP countries, those were not committed to grant equivalent concessions 
to European exporters. It was hailed as a great success for developing countries as it was seen at the time 
as providing them with the possibility of basing an industrial development behind protected borders, 
while oﬀ ering export expansions opportunities to the EEC thanks to preferential market access. Th e 
Trade provisions of the Convention were, however, countervailing to the MFN principles of the GATT 
Agreements, and necessitated a waiver in the GATT as detailed below. 
Due to prior trade arrangements between the UK and Commonwealth developing countries, special trade 
protocols were agreed for trade in bananas, beef and veal, rum, and sugar. Th ose agreements typically 
meant that the EU would buy an agreed quantity of those commodities at a price signiﬁ cantly above the 
world price. Th e Lomé Convention also introduced an innovative mechanism aimed at compensating 
ACP members in case of a fall in their commodity export revenues. STABEX, was therefore introduced by 
the ﬁ rst Lomé Convention  (1975), with a view to oﬀ ering compensations for ACP states that experienced 
a brutal decline in their revenues from trade in agricultural goods. Th e second Lomé Conference (1980) 
introduced SYSMIN, an equivalent mechanism for revenues of trade in mineral commodities. Both 
STABEX and SYSMIN were funded through the EDF, making payment advances to ACP states that 
were supposed to be refunded at a later stage.
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Financial cooperation was also an important feature of the successive Lomé Conventions. Th e European 
Development Fund (EDF), and the European Investment Bank (EIB) were both created by the Treaty of 
Rome in 1957. While the EIB also had other objectives and areas of interventions, notably in the EEC 
itself, the EDF was a ﬁ nancial arm solely dedicated at providing support to the ACP community. Th e focus 
of the EDF funded projects shifted with time according to development priorities and strategies. Th us, 
Lomé I (1975-1980) focused on infrastructure, with an allotment to the EDF of over 3 billion ECUs. 
Lomé II (1980-1985) saw the continuation of the priority focus on infrastructure development, but an 
increase in the fund resources to 4.725 billion ECU. Under Lomé III (1985-1990), both infrastructure 
and rural development were the major EDF priorities. EDF funding was then raised to 7.4 billion ECUs. 
Lomé IV emphasised support to the Structural Adjustment Programmes that some ACP states were 
implementing.
Th e political dimension of the ACP-EU partnership was especially emphasised in the Lomé IV (and IV 
bis) Convention. At this stage, respect of Human Rights and good governance, as well as the recognition 
of the importance of gender issues became a component of the agreements. Importantly, for the ﬁ rst 
time under Lomé IV, those commitments could be used by the EU to limit its support to countries that 
would not respect them.
A need for a renewed partnership
Although the Lomé partnership was hailed as “the most comprehensive North South partnership” it has 
clearly not met its objective development. Africa has lagged behind the rest of the developing world, both 
in terms of its integration in World trade6, but also and more importantly in terms of poverty reduction and 
socio-economic development. Despite a few exceptions - such as the case of Mauritius in textile and apparel 
– unilateral preferences granted under the successive Lomé conventions showed a very limited positive 
impact for Africa, and did not trigger the expected take oﬀ  in industrial exports. Th us, ACP countries’ 
exports saw their share of the EU market diminish from eight percent in 1975 to 2.8 percent in 2000. 
Moreover, the composition of ACP’s export has - with a few exceptions- showed little sign of diversiﬁ cation 
since 19757.  Along the same lines, per capita GDP in sub-Saharan Africa grew by an average of only 0.4 
percent over the 1960-1992 period, compared with 2.3 percent for developing countries as a whole8. 
Moreover, a change in the attitude of the EU towards the WTO compatibility of its trade regime with 
the ACP countries also occurred. As discussed in the section below, non-reciprocal preferences granted 
to the ACP group by the EU required a waiver from third parties in the WTO. After 25 years of such 
arrangements the EU since the mid-90’s started seeking a return to a reciprocal arrangement more 
compatible with WTO obligations. Being itself a strong proponent of a rules based multilateral trading 
system, the EU is now putting greater emphasis on the WTO compatibility of its trade regime. Moreover, 
obtaining a waiver required negotiations in the WTO on behalf of the EU, which entailed necessary 
concessions to be made to third parties as a consequence. Commentators have argued that the EU also 
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became reluctant to continue with non-reciprocal trade preferences under the ACP partnership for this 
last reason9.
Moreover, ﬁ nancial mechanisms such as STABEX and SYSMIN proved largely insuﬃ  cient in preventing 
a further slide in Africa’s Terms of Trade. One of the main reasons put forward is the lack of funding 
for those mechanisms so they could not eﬀ ectively prevent a strong deterioration of export earnings10. 
Moreover, EDF and EIB funding mechanisms have also been recognized as too complex in their 
administrations, which has been seen as a limiting factor to its utilization by the intended beneﬁ ciaries. 
Large amounts from the EDF were frequently rolled-over to the next period, as they could not be utilized 
due to heavy and lengthy procedures.
Other reasons weighted for a signiﬁ cant overhaul of the ACP-EU partnership. Th ey include geo-strategic 
concerns on behalf of the EU, such as the shift in focus of the priorities towards Eastern Europe and 
Southern Mediterranean states, following the end of the Cold War. Th ey also included an amount of what 
has been labelled “donor fatigue”, the reduced political will to provide ﬁ nancial resources to intervene 
in development issues. Finally, it has also been argued that the EU chose to move to reciprocal trade 
arrangements with the ACP countries in order to secure its market access in those regions, in the light of 
increased penetration of third parties such as the USA or Asian countries on African markets.
By the end of 1996, the EU initiated an analytical work to explore follow-up possibilities to the 
Lomé Convention. Th e Commission published in 1997 a “Green Paper11” on the future of the ACP-
EU relationship. Talks were initiated with the ACP group for the content of the future framework of 
cooperation between the ACP and the EU. After two years of negotiations, these discussions led to the 
signature in June 2000, of the new ACP-EU agreement, in Cotonou, Benin.
Th e compatibility of regional economic agreements with the WTO provisions
One of the most basic WTO principles – the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment – stipulates that 
a trade concession granted by a member state to another should be automatically extended to all other 
WTO members (Article I of the General Agreement on Tariﬀ s and Trade). Th ere are two main exceptions 
to this MFN principle. Th e ﬁ rst one allows preferential treatment when based on development concerns, 
the second one is with regard to free trade areas.
Th e “Enabling clause” authorises “preferential and more favourable treatment to developing countries”, on the 
basis that they are oﬀ ered by a party, to all developing countries or all Least Developed Countries, without 
discrimination. Th e “Enabling clause” is for example utilised to provide preferential market access under 
schemes such as the various Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) in favour of all developing countries, 
or the Everything but Arms initiative (EBA), which the EU provides to the LDCs. Th e “enabling clause” 
may also be utilized for preferential trade liberalization among developing countries.
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Th e WTO GATT agreements also contains provisions allowing for derogation to the MFN principle in 
the case of regional trade agreements. Article XXIV of the GATT-1947, completed by an understanding 
attached to the Marrakech Agreement on GATT-1994 deﬁ nes the modalities under which WTO 
members may not respect the MFN clause in trade in goods, when engaging in a free trade agreement 
process. Article V (para. 3.a) of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) provides with 
similar exemptions with regard to trade in services. Both article XXIV of GATT and article V of 
GATS stipulate that more preferential treatment may be granted among some members, without 
automatic extension to the entire WTO membership as is normally required under the MFN clause. 
Th e justiﬁ cation behind this derogation to the MFN principle is that, under certain conditions, free 
trade agreements beneﬁ t not only their members, but also the global economy as a whole, through 
trade creation which results in increased overall welfare. Free trade agreements such as the EPAs clearly 
could fall under that category, provided they are of a reciprocal nature (i.e. both parties oﬀ er each other 
symmetrical preferential treatment). 
However, ACP countries might want to explore possibilities of maintaining a certain degree of asymmetry 
in their future agreement with the EU. Article XXIV leaves room for ambiguity with regard to this point. 
In particular, article 8-b) stipulates that “duties and other restrictive regulations […] are [to] be eliminated 
on substantially all the trade” between the members of a preferential agreements. Th e exact meaning 
of “ substantially all the trade” is strongly debated. How much trade may not be liberalized is a crucial 
question, and could be important for African countries willing to maintain some protection on some of 
their trade with the EU in the context of an EPA. It is generally thought that at least 90 percent of the 
trade has to be liberalized under a free trade agreement, but there is no legal conﬁ rmation for that ﬁ gure. 
Th e EU-South Africa free trade agreement, for example did interpret the Article XXIV in a manner 
allowing for some protection within the 90 percent limit, in a non-reciprocal manner. Under this free 
trade agreement, the EU agreed to extend liberalization on 95 percent of its trade with South Africa, 
while South Africa agreed to liberalize “only” 86 percent of its imports from the EU12.
Article XXIV also maintains some ambiguity on schedule to accomplish liberalization. Here the agreement 
mentions “a reasonable length of time” (Art.XXIV, par. 5c). Again, there is no legal or oﬃ  cial interpretation 
of what a reasonable length of time might be, although it is conventionally thought to be ten years. For 
example, South Africa was oﬀ ered 12 years to implement liberalization in its Free trade agreement with the 
EU, more time than the EU is allowed to liberalize its imports from South Africa. Again, the ambiguity 
contained in Article XXIV has in this case been utilized to maintain a certain degree of asymmetry. Th e 
schedule of liberalization may be important for African countries implementing EPAs, as they determine 
how much time they have to proceed to internal industrial adjustments before liberalization.
Importantly for African countries (and also for other developing countries), the Doha Declaration 
launched an eﬀ ort to clarify the understanding of Article XXIV and the role of Special and Diﬀ erential 
treatment in regional trade agreements. Th ese points of negotiations under the WTO will be of crucial 
13
importance in determining the future shape of EPAs, and the degree of ﬂ exibility African countries might 
enjoy under them. 
Th e Cotonou agreement
Th e new Cotonou agreement will run for a duration of twenty years, with possible revisions every ﬁ ve 
years and renegotiations of the ﬁ nancial protocol at the same intervals. Th e new agreement rests on ﬁ ve 
interdependent pillars:
• a comprehensive political dimension consisting in an enhanced dialogue, and a special focus on 
conﬂ ict prevention and resolution, as well as on governance issues and the respect of human rights 
and the rule of law,
• a set of participatory approaches, including greater emphasis on the role of civil society,
• a focus on poverty reduction, and a central role for the private sector and regional integration in 
development strategies,
• a new framework for trade and economic cooperation that would put regional integration at the 
fore-front, and extended cooperation to non-trade areas,
• a reform of ﬁ scal cooperation, through the simpliﬁ cation and enhanced ﬂ exibility of the ﬁ nancial 
instruments of the partnership as well as the introduction of a performance criteria in the allocation 
of aid.
As far as trade is concerned, the Cotonou agreement does not really detail the provisions for the future. 
It does however oﬀ er the pursuit of Lomé non-reciprocal trade arrangements until 2008 at the latest, 
and oﬀ er a framework of negotiations for future trade arrangement after that date. Th is arrangement was 
validated by another waiver, granted by WTO members during the Doha WTO Ministerial Conference 
in September 200113. After this deadline, the agreement stipulates clearly that a WTO compatible trade 
arrangement will have to be put in place14. Concretely, the new trading arrangements could take the form 
of free trade agreements between the EU on one side and ACP regional groupings on the other hand. 
Th ose agreements would take the name of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) to reﬂ ect the fact that 
their objectives and content also reﬂ ect strong development concerns. Th e Cotonou agreement does not 
specify however how the group of countries negotiating the EPAs with the EU would be constituted.
Under the Cotonou agreement however, ACP countries may choose not to take part in EPAs. Hence, 
ACP LDCs that choose not be part of EPAs would still to a large extent beneﬁ t from duty free access to 
the EU’s markets under the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative. On the other hand, non-LDC ACP 
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countries would face less certainty. Th e Agreement stipulates that alternatives will be explored for such 
countries in order to provide them with “a new framework for trade which is equivalent to their existing 
situation”. Concretely, there are two main options available to non-LDC ACP countries. Th e ﬁ rst one 
would be to negotiate trade bilateral agreements with the EU. Th e second one would be to start utilising 
the General Scheme of Preferences (GSP) through which the EU grants preferential market access to 
all developing countries. Th is last solution would probably mean a signiﬁ cant erosion of preferences 
for African countries, whose exports would then be treated on a par with those from other developing 
countries including more competitive ones. Finally, it would also be possible for non-LDC ACP countries 
to resort to exporting to the EU under the MFN clause, but that would clearly be of lesser interests than 
to use the GSP scheme, however imperfect.
Today, it seems that most ACP African countries have chosen to be part of an EPA. Th is signiﬁ es -among 
other major consequences- that reciprocity in trade relations will be the future of Africa-EU relations
Some issues for African countries in the EPAs process in the WTO context
At the date of writing, it seems that most African countries opted for the EPA process. Most commentators 
seem to believe that this was in part due to potential advantages that the EU would confer to EPA 
members, such as increased assistance, aid and capacity building support. Clearly, it was thought that 
the EU was itself in favour of the EPA solution, among other things to promote regional integration in 
Africa, and also to reduce the number of negotiations it would have to hold simultaneously.
One of the hardest problem to solve for African countries was the overlapping of regional groupings. For 
various political and historical reasons, one individual country may be part of several regional economic 
groupings. Out of the 53 African countries, only 6 belong to just one regional economic communities 
(RECs), 26 are members of two groupings, 20 are members of 3 groupings and one (Democratic 
Republic of Congo) belongs to four15. Moreover, while some regional economic communities were 
thought to be very dynamic (UEMOA, SADC, for example), others were seen as dormant. Th e choice of 
which regional grouping to join for EPA negotiations, was a very crucial diﬃ  cult one for some African 
countries. Countries that may have important economic and political ties with other African countries 
outside their own EPA may hence have an important stake to actively promote cooperation mechanisms 
and ties among EPAs.
Moreover, as seen in the previous section, current WTO negotiations under the Doha Round may 
profoundly transform the overall trade context in which EPA will be negotiated. As discussed, the 
negotiations to clarify the content of Article XXIV of GATT and Article V of GATS will be crucial. Th ey 
will determine the degree of non-reciprocity as well as the degree of exemption from coverage that will be 
allowed to developing countries negotiating preferential trade agreements. African countries engaged in 
EPA negotiations have therefore a high stake in these negotiations. Other negotiations in the WTO may 
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aﬀ ect the outcome of EPAs for African countries. For example, market access negotiations may result 
in a further deterioration in the preferential margins that African countries would enjoy under the EPA 
on the EU’s markets. If the EU agrees to deep cuts in its protection under the MFN treatment, then the 
actual beneﬁ t of a free trade agreement with the EU may be substantially reduced for African countries. 
One particular point of the future of Cotonou -crucial for some ACP countries- will also be determined 
by the future negotiations in the WTO: the trade protocols. Th ose protocols are often criticized by non-
ACP developing countries and their future seems to be elimination. What mechanisms will replace them 
will be a crucial issue for some African countries, such as Botswana (beef ) or Mauritius (sugar), and 
WTO negotiations on agriculture carry a high stake for them for this particular reason.
In addition, in view of the content of other EU agreements with developing countries, some commentators 
have raised a warning for African countries not to accept a “WTO-plus” agenda under EPAs. For example, 
African countries have been vocally opposed to the inclusion of some of the Singapore issues in the Doha 
Round. Th ey should therefore be cautious not to be imposed excessive commitments on those issues or 
on intellectual property protection in the EPA context.
Finally, reduction in tariﬀ  protection resulting from free trade agreements mechanically result in a loss in 
ﬁ scal revenues. Th is should also be an important concern for many African countries undertaking EPAs 
with the EU. Th ey will experience a loss of tariﬀ  revenues, ﬁ rstly on tariﬀ  imposed on imports from other 
members of their REC, secondly on tariﬀ s imposed on imports from the EU. Th is may cause signiﬁ cant 
problems for those African countries where tariﬀ  revenue constitute a large part of the government 
budget, and for which a lot of imports originates either in the EU or in neighbouring countries.
16
Emerging Empirical Evidence on EPAs and the Economies of 
ACP Countries
Introduction
In this chapter, we review some of the available evidence on the likely implications of the EPAs on ACP 
countries. Th e studies so far carried out on EPAs are of two categories. Th e ﬁ rst category is those studies 
that have attempted rigorous empirical analysis. Th e second category consists of descriptive (analytical) 
studies. Th e former group of studies, while trying to be empirical, have leaned more towards the partial 
equilibrium analysis following the Viner-type model of analysing regional trade agreements. Th e analytical 
category of studies has dominated nevertheless. 
While quantitative studies on the EPAs have been few, in this chapter, these studies are reviewed together 
with some of the analytical ones. Th e objective is to uncover the evidence so far on the likely implications 
of the EPAs on African economies in particular. As a study by COMESA in 2002 notes, three key 
diﬃ  culties fetter research on the subject: lack of good quality data; lack of clear understanding of what 
EPAs will comprise of ultimately; and inability to project the future multilateral trading system and 
production systems in ACP countries in the next two decades or so.
Th e chapter is organized along the quantiﬁ able themes of the EPAs impacts on the African economies. 
Fiscal systems impacts are addressed ﬁ rst; second, is a focus on Africa’s economic structures in the context 
of the role of agriculture and manufacturing sectors. Th e evidence on the social welfare implications 
is addressed in the third section. Fourthly, the evidence on the regional integration question and by 
extension the intra-African trade regime is considered. And ﬁ nally, the post-EPA position for non-EU 
rest of the world in Africa is highlighted.
EPAs to exacerbate strain on ﬁ scal systems in Africa
Most countries have been concerned with the revenue implications of the EPAs. In particular, they will 
be coming into force at the mid-point period when governments will be under enormous pressure to 
show their results in addressing the Millennium Development Goals. In that respect, quantifying the 
revenue impacts of the EPAs has been one of the preoccupations of the studies undertaken to assess them. 
EUROSTEP (2004) provides some estimates based on ﬁ ve case studies. Th ree of the countries are African: 
Cameroon, Benin and Ghana. Th e study estimated that between 20-30 percent of the Cameroonian 
governments revenue would be lost following a reciprocal free trade with the EU, taking into account 
accumulated job losses, tax shortfalls and lower growth rates. Ghana on the other hand would experience 
20 percent reduction in cocoa exports revenues alone considering that cocoa is the largest export to the 
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EU of Ghana making up to 37 percent of all exports. Th e methodology applied in this study could be 
criticized for its lack of rigour, and also for the lobby-factor, as it relies on experiences and forecasts of 
people from the ﬁ ve countries working in the sectors that are critical to poverty alleviation. In spite of 
lack of methodological rigour, and allowing for lobby-factor, there is the industry knowledge by the 
respondents, which provide some insights on potential outcomes.
COMESA (2002) looks at the broad issues that its member countries would have to contend with in 
the EPAs negotiations. Th e issues covered in this early impact assessment focused on the EPAs impacts 
on trade and economic policy orientation. Th e study concluded that the costs of EPAs would be the 
loss of revenue to governments and the associated adjustment costs of developing alternative sources of 
government revenue. Th e broad ﬁ nding was that if all EU imports came in free of duty, on the basis of 
trade statistics for 2000, governments in the COMESA region would lose about a quarter (25 percent) of 
their trade taxes and about six percent of their total tax revenue. Th e COMESA study, like other studies, 
correctly notes that while a loss of six percent of tax revenue may not seem to be a huge amount of money 
to make up over an extended period, the precarious situation in which most ﬁ scal systems in COMESA 
countries are in would present major adjustment diﬃ  culties. Reforming the tax administrations in 
COMESA countries with a view to establishing elastic and buoyant tax systems would be considerable 
adjustment costs for these countries.
While the COMESA study was more analytical than empirical, it clearly identiﬁ ed factors upon which 
the loss of revenue to governments would be dependent upon: percentage of total tax revenue made up 
by trade taxes; the percentage of imports coming in from the EU; and whether the supply of goods from 
the EU will increase as a result of a reduction in tariﬀ s. Suﬃ  ce to add at this point that the COMESA 
(2002) study, using ex post analysis16, concluded that just as the revenue implications of the introduction 
of the COMESA FTA were overestimated, there was a danger that the EPAs revenue implications for 
COMESA countries might also be overestimated.
Another early study was undertaken on the likely impacts of the EPAs on SADC countries17. Tekere and 
Ndlela (2003) in addressing the EPAs question for SADC examined the trade aspects of the Cotonou 
Agreement for the Southern African countries. Relying on a partial equilibrium modelling framework, the 
study showed that EPAs would result in signiﬁ cant reduction in revenues. Due to the signiﬁ cant imports 
from the EU, all the countries would experience revenue shortfalls immediately the process of tariﬀ s 
dismantlement began under the reciprocation process. Cumulatively, countries like Tanzania will experience 
at least 37 percent decline in tariﬀ  revenues. Signiﬁ cant reductions will also occur for Namibia at 24 percent. 
Th ese shortfalls while not unexpected will pose serious ﬁ scal adjustment challenges for these countries.
Busse et al. (2004) studied the potential impacts of EPAs on ECOWAS countries. Th eir study focused on 
the trade and budget eﬀ ects. Applying a partial equilibrium methodology that follows the Viner model, 
Busse et al. examined the implications of complete tariﬀ  barrier elimination for EU goods in ECOWAS 
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countries. Th e study found that in absolute terms, decline in import duties would range from US$2.2 
million in Guinea-Bissau to US$487.8 million in Nigeria. As a share of total import taxes, the decline 
will be largest in Cape Verde where 80 percent of import revenues are likely to be lost. Th e ﬁ scal budget 
positions of the ECOWAS countries will therefore be under substantial stress in the case of total tariﬀ  
barrier elimination. Cape Verde and Gambia will particularly be severely aﬀ ected given the estimated 
total government revenue shortfalls associated with EPAs of 20 and 22 percent respectively. Assuming no 
adjustment from the expenditure side, the budget deﬁ cits in these countries will worsen by 4.1 and 3.5 
percent of GDP respectively.
Undiversiﬁ ed economic structures in Africa to face unprecedented challenges
African countries have been credited with signiﬁ cant unilateral trade liberalization measures since the 
advent of the continent’s adjustment programmes. Th ese liberalization measures for some countries took 
place at the same time as commitments at the multilateral level were being implemented. However, the 
Cotonou Partnership Agreement calls for much deeper liberalization of trade with EU whose trade with 
African countries ranks ﬁ rst for almost all these countries. EUROSTEP (2004) estimated that only 25 
percent of Ghanaian industries would survive without import tariﬀ s support following implementation 
of free trade with the EU. 
Meyn (2004) focuses on Botswana, Mauritius and Mozambique and reinforces the argument that under 
the North-South arrangement that the EPAs are going to have, trade diversion has the potential of 
dominating the trade creation eﬀ ects. Granting the free market access for EU would then imply that the 
ACP countries would not have the chance to build-up own industries or set-up sustainable market chains. 
Meyn therefore concludes that while EPAs would have to be WTO compliant at the end of the day, in 
order to mitigate upon the de-industrialization that will occur, the EPAs should aim to build upon strong 
South-South integration. In eﬀ ect, Meyn (2004) calls for deepening of the South-South integration ﬁ rst 
before the enforcing of the dismantling of tariﬀ s objectives of the EPAs. Like most studies on EPAs to date, 
Meyn (2004) is also more analytical than empirical, making it diﬃ  cult to provide evidence on some of the 
propositions such as the clear argument that the ACP countries would beneﬁ t most from EPAs if they were 
allowed to deepen integration among themselves. Th e level of integration among the ACP countries that is 
optimal to guarantee the gains that Meyn (2004) foresees is not clear from studies such as Meyn’s.
Busse et al. (2004) also quantiﬁ es the potential trade eﬀ ects of the EPAs, bringing out clearly the trade 
diversion elements of an EPA between the EU and ECOWAS countries. Th e total trade eﬀ ects estimated 
for ECOWAS countries range from 5.2 percent in Guinea-Bissau to 20.8 percent in Nigeria. Overall, 
the study found that trade creation eﬀ ects in ECOWAS will far outweigh trade diversion. However, at a 
more highly disaggregated level, some trade diversion eﬀ ects were found to exceed trade creation eﬀ ects as 
is likely to be the case for petroleum oils for Ghana. More importantly however in the ECOWAS study, 
is the focus on sensitive products in terms of impacts on trade and import duty revenues. Th e study 
19
established that a few product categories are sensitive in almost all ECOWAS countries with respect to 
trade ﬂ ows. Th ese include apparel and clothing, footwear, sugar and related products, cereals and cereal 
products. In general, light manufactures will be aﬀ ected signiﬁ cantly under an EPA arrangement.
It is also not surprising that Tekere and Ndlela (2003) also shows that the EPAs are likely to have dramatic 
and challenging eﬀ ects on the weak and sensitive economic sectors of SADC countries. Th e concentration 
of SADC economies on primary and/or extractive sectors and also low-technology processing industries 
will also present great restructuring diﬃ  culties to these countries. In agriculture, cereals, food processing 
and dairy products were identiﬁ ed as sub-sectors that would be potentially adversely aﬀ ected by the EPAs 
in SADC. In the same vein, textiles, clothing, meat, beverages, leather and footwear were also identiﬁ ed 
as manufacturing sub-sectors in the SADC region that would suﬀ er greatly in the case of a EU-SADC 
EPA. Tekere and Ndlela study could be faulted for not giving quantiﬁ able eﬀ ects on the sectors outlined. 
In spite of this weakness, the qualitative method employed to identify these sectors does however give 
indications of the sectors that countries in SADC would have to be concerned with post-EPAs.
Similar ﬁ ndings with respect to impacts on sectors were reached analytically in the COMESA (2002) 
study. Th e study identiﬁ ed price and quality competition from EU-based industries to local manufacturers, 
especially given the lack of economies of scale and access to latest technologies for the latter, as a negative 
aspect of the EPAs. Without any quantiﬁ cation or pinpointing of actual COMESA sectors that will 
be aﬀ ected by the EU goods, de-industrialization, attendant loss of jobs and barriers to entry into new 
markets of local products were identiﬁ ed as the consequences from the EPAs for COMESA countries. 
COMESA (2002) unlike other studies, is however optimistic on the positive eﬀ ects of the EPAs on 
the performance of key sectors. Speciﬁ cally, exposure of local industries to competition is perceived as 
a positive element even though the study also identiﬁ es lack of economies of scale as an issue. Another 
positive aspect of the EPAs identiﬁ ed to likely beneﬁ t COMESA may be the dynamic eﬀ ects of the EPAs 
given the non-reversal nature of the policies that will be locked-in the agreements. While the COMESA 
study does well to identify the positive and negative aspects of the EPAs with respect to impacts on 
sectors, it fails to convincingly show whether the negatives will be oﬀ set by the positives.
Consumers in African countries will be major beneﬁ ciaries from the EPAs
Trade creation for EU producers and exporters within the EPAs arrangement reﬂ ects the displacement 
of ineﬃ  cient African producers in a given regional economic community arrangement. Th e SADC study 
showed that trade creation will far exceed the trade diversion in majority of the countries. Th e trade created 
in this setting implies the ability of the importers (both intermediate and ﬁ nal users) to access cheaper 
products from the EU. Ultimately, the cheaper imports translate into increased consumer welfare, which 
is a good proxy for the welfare gains by the consumers in the SADC countries considered in the Tekere 
and Ndlela (2003) study. As the COMESA (2002) study observes, consumers may welcome the variety 
and potentially lower priced goods, but the subsequent factory closures due to de-industrialization may 
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dampen and possibly wipe out the welfare improvements achieved by the consumers who double up as 
the losers bearing the brunt of industrial closures.
Th e results obtained from the COMESA and SADC studies were consistent with the ﬁ ndings of much 
earlier studies commissioned by the European Union and summarised in Gunning (1999) and McQueen 
(1999). In those initial studies, which as already noted used mainly partial equilibrium frameworks, the 
welfare eﬀ ects of an EPA were found to be unclear as trade diversion eﬀ ects were expected to reduce any 
welfare gains resulting from increased imports for the consumers and some of the producers. Empirical 
analysis of the exports side also resulted in very small welfare gains. In a partial equilibrium framework 
setting, the studies converge on the ﬁ nding that trade diversion eﬀ ects could dampen welfare gains. 
Investigating whether the same result would be achieved using general equilibrium frameworks is 
important at this stage if ﬁ rm conclusions are to be made on EPAs impacts on overall welfare. 
Th e interpretation of the welfare impacts of most of the partial equilibrium analysis results requires caution. 
Intuitively, trade creation is welfare improving since consumers are able to access cheaper products and 
probably of higher quality. Trade diversion on the other hand is welfare decreasing as noted by Busse et 
al (2004) because higher cost producers displace more eﬃ  cient sources of imports. Since trade creation 
eﬀ ects have a general tendency to exceed the trade diversion eﬀ ects in most partial equilibrium studies, 
there is the inevitable conclusion such as in Busse et al (2004) that an EPA between the EU and ECOWAS 
countries is likely to be welfare improving. Th e failure of these analytical frameworks to capture declines in 
producer surplus and given that government revenue shortfalls and trade diversion are non-additive means 
the impacts of liberalization within the EPAs will appear as welfare improving always.
Th e non-EU countries to face reduced market shares in Africa
In theory, the outcome of preferential trading arrangements with respect to trade depends on three 
important preconditions. Th ese preconditions can be explained brieﬂ y using the EPAs proposition. First, 
if the rest of the world supplies goods cheaply to a conﬁ gured EPA both before and after the enforcement 
of the EPA than the EU, then there is likely to be no change in trade expansion. Second, if the EU 
supplies the goods at lower prices both pre- and post-EPA than everyone else, then the implementation 
of the EPAs would lead to welfare improvement as prices go down because of tariﬀ  dismantlement and 
assuming elastic import demand for the EU goods, there would at the same time be trade creation. Th e 
third precondition and which worries the opponents of regionalism is the situation where the rest of 
the world is a cheaper supplier to the EPA before the EPAs’ enforcement compared to the EU but post-
EPAs, the EU becomes favoured by the tariﬀ  reduction. In this latter case, trade diversion is bound to 
occur. Given the unbalanced nature of integration process18 in Africa, the rest of the world that suﬀ ers 
as a result of trade diversion may include also African countries. Th erefore, EPAs in theory could lead to 
replacement of regional suppliers once tariﬀ s on EU imports are dismantled. Th e implications of this are 
two-fold. Firstly, intra-African trade, which is expected to create dynamics for deeper integration, will 
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be compromised. And secondly, the African region will ﬁ nd itself in a situation where there is increased 
dependence on EU imports, which in itself would prevent the continent from beneﬁ ting from embodied 
technologies that may be more superior to those of the EU. 
Th e SADC study by Tekere and Ndlela (2003) clearly showed that non-EU countries currently exporting 
into the SADC region will lose trade to EU producers and exporters in spite of the latter not necessarily 
being the most eﬃ  cient. Tekere and Ndlela (2003) quantiﬁ ed signiﬁ cant trade diversion that not only 
aﬀ ects the non-EU countries but also other African countries that are not part of the SADC grouping. 
While Tekere and Ndlela have not decomposed the trade diversion impacts to that aﬀ ecting non-SADC 
African and the rest of the world countries, it is clear that the US$79 million they estimate as trade 
diverted in the case of Tanzania for instance will hurt some African countries currently exporting to that 
country. Th us, EPAs are likely to harm intra-African trade, an outcome that is going to be contrary to 
the principle of deepening regional integration anticipated by the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. Th e 
same conclusion is arrived at in the case of COMESA where it is found out that imports coming from 
the region will be substituted by imports coming from the EU leading to reduced regional production 
and levels of economic activity.
Milner et al. (2002) in their study that considered the possibility of an EPA between the EU and the East 
African Community (EAC) had reached to a similar conclusion where trade diversion within the EAC 
would negate not only the integration eﬀ orts but would at the same time accelerate de-industrialization. 
Th eir results carried out using an extension of the model in Panagariya (1995) indicated that Kenya was 
going to lose signiﬁ cantly its market share in the two economies of Uganda and Tanzania. 
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More on the Analytical Methodology for EPAs Analysis
Introduction
Th is Chapter discusses in details the methodology applied for the empirical analysis. Th e discussion starts 
by outlining the GTAP modelling and data framework. Using GTAP database, the initial conditions 
which the African countries in the RECs are likely to be in before simulation experiments are highlighted. 
Th e GTAP model analysis is complemented in the study with a partial equilibrium analysis model. Th is 
is the SMART model developed jointly by Th e World Bank and UNCTAD. Th e SMART methodology 
is therefore also described in this Chapter. Th e partial equilibrium model is aimed to help surmount 
some of the shortcomings of the GTAP methodology given that the majority of African countries are not 
included in the database.
Rationale for a General Equilibrium Methodology
Trade policy analysis largely involves analysing implications of trade policy instruments on the production 
structure in economies at the national and global level. Trade policy instruments such as tariﬀ s and 
quotas have direct and indirect eﬀ ects on the relative prices of commodities produced in a given country. 
As the mix of goods and services produced change, the demands for factors of production also change. 
Consequently, in any given economy, it is diﬃ  cult to conceive a situation where the change in trade 
policy would aﬀ ect only one sector. Due to the forward and backward linkages and their related strengths 
existing in a particular economy, the result is always one in which the relative mix of sectoral outputs 
change. Th is by extension aﬀ ects the relative mix of the diﬀ erent factors of production in the diﬀ erent 
sectors. 
Th e country-level eﬀ ects on output mix and demands for factors of production can in the context of 
international trade be extended to the global economy. Changes in relative prices of outputs and inputs 
resulting in a given country’s change in trade policy are transmitted to the industries and input markets 
of other economies that the country trades with. Th erefore, for trade policy analysis to be meaningful 
and for robust results to be produced, the interactions that prevail among diﬀ erent sectors as a result of a 
change in a given or group of countries trade policy instruments must be taken into account. Th e general 
equilibrium methodology provides an analytical framework that allows these inter- and intra-sectoral 
changes in output mix and by extension the demand for diﬀ erent factors of production to be captured. 
Kehoe and Kehoe (1994) capture succinctly the essence of general equilibrium models. General 
equilibrium models are an abstraction that is complex enough to capture the essential features of the 
economy, yet simple enough to be tractable. Th ese models are popular over their partial equilibrium 
23
counterparts because they stress the interactions among diﬀ erent sectors. However, they are not perfect, 
especially the static ones. Th is is because they fail to take account of the dynamic eﬀ ects that accompany 
changes taking place in a given economy as a result of policy change. Th e Global Trade Analysis Project 
(GTAP) model is in this class of general equilibrium models. GTAP is a multi-region computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model designed for comparative-static analysis of trade policy issues (Adams et al. 
1997).  It can be used to capture eﬀ ects on output mix, factor usage, trade eﬀ ects and resultant welfare 
distribution between countries as a result of changing trade policies at the country, bilateral, regional 
and multilateral levels. Since the GTAP model puts emphasis on resource reallocation across economic 
sectors, it is a good instrument for identifying the winning and losing countries and sectors under policy 
changes involving the trade aspects of the EPAs.
A Brief Look at the Th eoretical Framework of the GTAP Model
Th ere is abundant literature discussing the underlying theory of the GTAP modelling framework. Th e 
theory of the GTAP model is documented in Hertel (1997). Brockmeier (2001) provides a simpliﬁ ed 
graphical exposition of the model. Th e GTAP model is essentially a multi-country multi-commodity 
model. Th e theory of the GTAP model resembles that underlying the standard multi-regional single 
country CGE models.  Th e origins of GTAP can indeed be traced to the ORANI model, a regional single 
country general equilibrium model19 ﬁ rst developed for the Australian economy (see Dixon et al. 1997). 
Th e modelling of each region in GTAP is based on ORANI model. Th e theory of the ORANI model 
has been extended to allow international trade to take place between the diﬀ erent countries in the global 
economy through introduction of a global transport sector and savings institution.  
Essentially, the underlying theory of GTAP is captured in two types of equations. Th e key drivers of 
the model are the behavioural equations, which are based on microeconomic theory. Th ese equations 
capture the behaviour of agents in the economy. Accordingly there are behavioural equations for the 
consumers and also for the international trade (exports and imports). Th e behavioural equations capture 
the behaviour of the optimizing agents such as the consumers that allows the derivation of the demand 
functions. Th e second type of the equations is the accounting relationships. Th ese are essential in order 
to ensure that the behavioural equations solution occurs within a consistent macroeconomic framework. 
Th us, the accounting relationships ensure that the receipts and the expenditures of all the agents 
(consumers, producers, government, rest-of-the-world) are balanced. Hertel (1997) covers in details the 
theory behind the model and the derivations of the behavioural equations20. For the purposes of this 
study, these derivations are taken as given and the study simply provides just the broad outline of what 
the GTAP model is like.
Th e GTAP model allows international mobility of capital, multiple trading regions, multiple goods and 
primary factors, empirically based diﬀ erences in production technology and consumer preferences across 
regions and explicit recognition of a global transport sector (Siriwardana 2001). In each region there are 
24
ﬁ ve types of factors of production. First, the model recognizes two types of labour (skilled and unskilled) 
and a single, homogenous capital good. Th en there is land and other natural resources that also form part 
of the set of the factors of production.  In the typical closure of the model, total supplies of labour and 
land are ﬁ xed for each region, but capital can cross regional borders to equalise changes in rates of return. 
In other words, there is clear distinction between those factors that are perfectly mobile and those that are 
sluggish in adjusting. In the case of the mobile factors, they earn the same market return regardless of the 
use location. As for the sluggish factors, returns in equilibrium may be diﬀ erent across sectors.
In the derivation of factor inputs demands, the model structure uses constant returns to scale technology 
and nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production functions with three levels.  Two categories 
of inputs to production are recognized, the intermediate inputs and the primary factors. Th e technology 
is assumed to be weakly separable between the primary and intermediate factors of production. Th ere 
are two advantages of the separability assumption. First, proﬁ t maximizing ﬁ rms are able to select their 
optimal mix of primary factors independently of the prices of intermediate inputs and vice-versa. Second, 
it also implies that the elasticity of substitution between primary factors and that between intermediate 
inputs at the middle nest is equal.  In each region, each sector chooses the mix of inputs to minimize total 
cost for a given level of output.  At the highest (top) nest level, intermediate input bundles and primary 
factor bundles are used in ﬁ xed proportions.  At the middle nest, intermediate input bundles are formed 
through combinations of similar imported and domestic intermediate goods. Similarly, primary factors 
bundles are formed through combinations of labour, capital and land at this middle nest.  In both cases 
the aggregator function has a CES form.  At the lowest level, imported bundles are formed through CES 
combinations of imported goods from each region.
Each region or composite21 region in GTAP has a single representative household that collects all the 
regional income.  Th is representative household aggregate income is exhausted through constant shares22
to private household consumption, government expenditures and national savings.  Th e private household 
buys bundles of commodities to maximize utility subject to its expenditure constraint.  Th e constrained 
optimizing behaviour of the private household is represented by Constant Diﬀ erence Elasticity (CDE) 
demand system. Th e CDE function is not as general as the commonly used CES and Linear Expenditure 
System (LES) but is more ﬂ exible and easy to calibrate with diﬀ erent price and income elasticities of 
consumption by region. Th e consumption bundles are CES combinations of domestic goods and import 
bundles, with the import bundles being CES aggregations of imports from each region. 
Demand equals supply in all markets, which are, considered competitive implying equality between the 
price received by the producer and the producer’s marginal cost.  Regional governments intervene in 
their own markets by imposing taxes and subsidies on commodities and primary factors, thus driving 
wedges between prices paid by purchasers and prices received by producers.  Th ese policy interventions 
are modelled as ad valorem taxes, tariﬀ s and subsidies, or quantitative restrictions in the case of textile and 
apparel trade.  International trade is linked through Armington substitution among goods diﬀ erentiated 
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by country of origin.  Th erefore, in markets for traded commodities, buyers diﬀ erentiate between 
domestically produced products and imported products with the same name.  Product diﬀ erentiation 
between imports by region of origin allows for two-way trade across regions in each tradable product.  
Other general features of the model are its explicit recognition of savings by regional economies. Th ese 
savings are completely exhausted on investments that are savings-driven in the model. In the static form 
of GTAP, current investment is assumed not to aﬀ ect the production capacity of the industries, as it is not 
yet installed. Th e demand for investments however aﬀ ects economic activity through its eﬀ ect on patterns 
of production in the capital goods producing sector in each region to service investment. Th e cost-
minimizing capital creator in each region combines inputs to assemble units of capital, subject to a nested 
production technology similar to that facing each sector for current production.  Th e only diﬀ erence is 
that the capital creator does not use primary factors.  Th e use of primary factors in capital creation is 
recognized indirectly through inputs of commodities to capital construction. In essence, capital goods are 
just a Leontief combination of other goods typically. Th ey do not require value added.  
Investment in each region is ﬁ nanced from a global pool of savings.  Each region contributes a ﬁ xed 
proportion of its income to the savings pool.  Two alternative ways can be used to allocate the savings 
pool.  Th e ﬁ rst way is where each region’s share increases by the proportion in which aggregate pool 
increases.  Th e second way is where the investment allocation is done according to the relative rates of 
return.  Regions, which experience increases in their rate of return relative to the global average, will 
receive increased shares of the investment budget, whereas regions experiencing reductions in their rate 
of return relative to the global average will receive reduced shares.  
Th e GTAP framework described above relies on country and regional input-output tables as its database. 
More speciﬁ cally, the GTAP database comprises: input-output data for each region, bilateral trade data 
derived from United Nations trade statistics; and support and protection data derived from a number of 
sources. A discussion on the database follows including a description of the characteristics of the African 
economies already captured in the version of the database used in the study.
Th e GTAP Database and the Study Aggregation
Data description
Th e GTAP model is used together with the GTAP database. Th e database, like the model, captures diﬀ erent 
individual and composites of countries. In this exposition, Version 5 of the database is utilized. Th is base 
year for this version is 1997 and recognizes 66 regions as well as 57 sectors and 5 factors of production. Th us, 
for each of the individual or composite region, there are 57 sectors whose data is captured in the overall 
GTAP database. As already pointed out, not all countries are individually captured in GTAP, however, all 
the world economies are part of the database as they could be part of a given composite region or included 
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as part of the rest of the world23. Th us, global macroeconomic consistency holds. Unfortunately, only a 
very small proportion of African countries are individually disaggregated in Version 5 of the database. 
Majority of African countries are captured through one or other regional composite. Before turning to an 
aggregation scheme that allows a description of the initial conditions of the African countries as captured 
in the database, it is useful to describe very brieﬂ y what constitutes the GTAP database.
Bilateral trade data is a critical component of the GTAP database. It is this bilateral trade ﬂ ows that 
transmit policy and growth shocks between countries. Indeed, trade shares are important in explaining 
the simulation results. Th e bilateral trade is also important when it comes to looking at the terms of trade 
implications. Th e global bilateral data is sourced from the United Nations COMTRADE data. Th is is 
supplemented with individual countries global trade information and trade totals or aggregate bilateral 
trade statistics such as from the IMF, FAO and World Bank.
Another important sub-component of the GTAP database is the protection data. Th is data is both explicit 
and implicit. Explicit in the sense that tariﬀ  revenue or export revenue by commodity is available. In 
addition, anti-dumping data by commodity and region is also obtainable. It is implicit in the sense that 
the bilateral trade data is available both in market and world prices. Th e key sources of the protection data 
vary. In the case of tariﬀ s, the agricultural tariﬀ s are obtained from the Economic Research Service, the 
EU and the applied or MFN rates. Merchandise tariﬀ s on the other hand are available from the World 
Integrated Trade Solution project of the World Bank and UNCTAD (details of WITS are presented 
in the section below discussing the SMART methodology). Th e domestic support protection data is 
obtained from the OECD’s producer subsidy equivalent tables and this can be divided into output 
subsidies, input subsidies, land-based and capital-based payments.
What is the Character of the African Countries: Evidence from GTAP Database 
Aggregation
Policy analysis requires an aggregation that is not only tractable but also one that gives suﬃ  cient 
information that would allow objective recommendations to be arrived at. In this context, it is necessary 
to undertake a reasonable aggregation of the global GTAP database to a level that would allow the study 
achieve its objectives. If majority of African countries were included individually in the GTAP database, 
the main principle that would guide the aggregation is to have a fair disaggregation of the African regions. 
Unfortunately, given the limited number of African countries in the GTAP database, the aggregation 
described in this chapter is to allow exposition of the characteristics of the African countries24. Th is 
exposition allows the trade policy impacts on Africa to be put in context. Th e 66 regions have therefore 
been aggregated to 12 regions with the individual African and composites of African countries as stand-
alones. Table 1 shows the regions’ aggregation scheme. As for the sectors, the aggregation should be at 
such a level that allows implications of the EPAs to be analysed at the level of primary commodities, light 
manufacturing, heavy industries, trade and services. Hence, the initial aggregation has an aggregation of 
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the original 57 GTAP sectors into 13 sectors. At this stage of methodology development, the commodities 
aggregation can be revisited depending on the kind of information the initial aggregation allows to be 
derived from the policy simulations. Th e two aggregations are shown in the following two tables.
Table 1: Regions Aggregation Scheme of the GTAP Version 5 Database
Code Aggregated Region GTAP Regions
EU25 European Union Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, United 
Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Hungary, Poland, Rest of Central 
European Association
BWA Botswana Botswana
XSC Rest of SACU Namibia and South Africa
MOZ Mozambique Mozambique
MWI Malawi Malawi
TZA Tanzania Tanzania
ZMB Zambia Zambia
ZWE Zimbabwe Zimbabwe
UGA Uganda Uganda
XSF Rest of Southern Africa Other Southern Africa (Angola)
XSS Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa
ROW All other regions Australia, New Zealand, China, Hong-Kong, Japan, Korea, 
Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, Vietnam, Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka and Rest 
of South Asia, Canada, USA, Mexico, Central American, 
Caribbean, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Rest of Andean Pact, 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Rest of South America, 
Switzerland, Rest of EFTA, Former Soviet Union, Turkey, Rest 
of Middle East, Morocco, Rest of North Africa, Rest of World
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Table 2: Commodity Aggregation Scheme of the GTAP Version 5 Database
Code Aggregated Sector GTAP Sectors
Cereals Grains Paddy rice, wheat, cereal grains nec
Vegetables Vegetables and Fruits Vegetables, Fruits, Nuts, 
Oilseeds Oil seeds Oil seeds, 
Sugar Sugar Sugar cane, Sugar beet,
Cotton Cotton Plant-based ﬁ bres
oCrops Other crops Crops nec
Livestock Animals and animal products Cattle, sheep, goat, horses, Animal products nec, 
Raw milk, Wool, silk-worm cocoons
Natresources Natural resources Forestry, Fishing, Coal, Oil, Gas, Minerals nec
Agroproc Agro-based industries Meat: cattle, sheep, goats, horse; Meat products nec, 
Vegetable oil and fats, Dairy products, Processed 
rice, Sugar, Food products nec, Beverages and 
tobacco products
Lightmanuf Light industries Textiles, Wearing apparel, Leather products, Wood 
products, Paper products, publishing
Industry Industrial sectors Petroleum, coal products, Mineral products nec, 
Chemical, rubber, plastic prods, Ferrous metals, 
metals nec, Metal products, Motor vehicles and parts, 
Transport equipment nec, Electronic equipment, 
Machinery and equipment nec, Manufactures nec
Services Utility services Electricity, Gas manufacture and distribution, Water, 
Construction, Communication, Financial services 
nec, Insurance, Business services nec, Recreation 
and other services, Dwellings, PubAdmin/Defence/
Health/Education
Trade Trade facilitation Trade, Sea transport, Air transport, 
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Th e Characteristics of the African Economies in the GTAP Database
In this sub-section the characteristics of the African economies as captured in GTAP database on the basis 
of the aggregation are described. Th ere are two aims for this discussion. Th e ﬁ rst aim is to present the 
stylized facts about these economies. Th e second and probably the most important objective is to show 
the nature of bilateral trade taking place between each of the countries with the EU in the ﬁ rst place and 
with the rest of the African countries. Hand in hand with this, the prevailing level of protection even 
before the EPA simulations will also be evident. Th e bilateral trade captured in the base data and the level 
of protection give the initial conditions that will be instrumental in understanding the results from the 
envisaged policy simulations.
Macroeconomic and Trade Characteristics of the African Economies
Table 3 gives a summary of the macroeconomic and trade characteristics of the African economies based 
on the 1997 base year data in the GTAP database. Clearly, the African economies are generally small in 
size with a GDP of less than US$10 billion. However, the size does vary. Malawi is the smallest economy 
with a size of US$2.8 billion. Th e rest of SACU (XSC), which basically represents the Republic of 
South Africa, is the largest economy. Th e distribution of this output in terms of value added shows an 
abundance of unskilled labour. Th is may have implication on the concentration and quality of goods. 
Capital is the most important in Botswana by nature of the structure of its economy as shown in Table 4. 
One important observation, which is not surprising all the same, is that the labour share of income is at 
least 50 per cent. With respect to trade aspects of the EPAs, allocative eﬃ  ciency of these factors is likely 
to determine the EPA impacts on the industry structure as currently shown in Table 4.
Probably the most important feature in the context of this study is the dependence of these economies on 
trade depicted in Table 3. Based on the sum of exports and imports as per cent of GDP, Botswana is the 
most open economy with openness equivalent to 107.7 per cent of GDP. Th e country depends extensively 
on trade. Th e vulnerability of an economy to external terms of trade shocks would be a concern given 
this level of openness. However, in the case of Botswana, it is evident that the balance of payments may 
not be a concern given the favourable terms of trade evidenced by the positive trade balance. It is also 
noteworthy that besides Botswana, several other countries export more than they import. Th ese include, 
rest of SACU, Malawi and Zambia. Uganda and Mozambique are the most closed economies on the basis 
of the sum of the shares of exports and imports to GDP. It is important to note that imports are quite 
suppressed for a number of the countries, as they constitute less than 30 per cent of GDP. Th is means 
that these economies are likely to be aﬀ ected by trade liberalization in the EPAs.
De-industrialization is of major concern in discussions related to trade. Even without considering 
the potential impacts of full reciprocity to EU by African countries under the EPAs, the issue of de-
industrialization in some countries within particular RECs have been of major concern. Th e rate of 
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liberalization in the African RECs has been checked by fears within the RECs that some economies 
would suﬀ er as a result of de-industrialization. Th e concern over de-industrialization has contributed to 
the pursuance of liberalization on the basis of asymmetry principle. Th is is likely to be an issue at the 
EPAs level where the asymmetry principle may be raised both in terms of the sectors to be liberalized and 
also the time frame for those sectors that eventually are chosen for liberalization under full reciprocity. 
Table 4 provides a clear picture of the structure26 of the African economies. 
Table 3: Macroeconomic Characteristics of the African and non-African Countries
EU BOT XSC MWI MOZ TZA ZAM ZWE XSA UGA XSS ROW
GDP and Trade Flows (Final Demand, billion US$, 1997)
GDP 8254.2 4.8 139.1 2.8 3.6 6.8 4.2 8.3 13.6 6.8 156.6 20381.0
Exports 2577.0 3.0 34.9 0.6 0.4 1.1 1.1 2.6 7.4 0.7 41.2 3739.2
Imports 2509.9 2.2 32.2 0.5 1.0 2.1 1.0 3.3 4.9 1.1 48.9 3802.2
Trade Dependence (shares, % GDP)
Exports 31.2 61.8 25.1 22.6 11.7 16.6 26.2 31.6 54.4 10.8 26.3 18.3
Imports 30.4 45.9 23.2 19.0 26.5 31.6 23.0 39.7 35.9 15.9 31.2 18.7
Factor Shares (% of Value Added)
Land 0.4 0.4 0.5 3.9 4.5 5.6 3.0 1.9 1.1 6.2 2.2 1.3
Unskilled Labour 33.4 22.2 40.7 43.2 42.4 43.5 39.8 38.6 27.4 48.3 41.7 35.8
Skilled Labour 21.8 12.2 19.6 9.5 8.1 5.4 10.3 15.0 11.4 6.6 10.7 20.9
Capital 44.1 61.7 37.3 42.6 44.1 44.3 45.6 43.7 50.2 38.0 40.6 41.1
Natural Resources 0.3 3.6 1.9 0.9 0.9 1.2 1.3 0.7 9.8 0.9 4.8 0.9
Source: GTAP Database Version 5 Aggregation
On the basis of the proportion of the value added that constitutes light manufactures and industry, the 
rest of SACU is the most industrialized. Zambia and Zimbabwe also have some signiﬁ cant industry at 
15 per cent of total value output. Th ese economies with some sizeable light manufacturing and industrial 
sectors are likely to be the most concerned by de-industrialization. However, the extent to which de-
industrialization takes place should not be considered in isolation as it would also depend on the 
abundance or lack of factors of production as shown in Table 3 which ultimately determine comparative 
advantage. Th e picture for individual countries in terms of production structure shows Botswana as a 
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predominantly resource-based economy at 28.8 percent of its value of output. Malawi, Mozambique, 
Tanzania, and Uganda are basically agricultural economies. Th ese economies and that of Botswana may 
not ﬁ nd reciprocity with EU on the primary commodities a major issue considering the share of labour in 
the value added, although this is an empirical question. Agro-based industries are signiﬁ cant in Tanzania 
and in at least four other individual countries. Competitiveness of such industries Africa-wide would 
be a major issue under the EPAs. Th e picture for individual countries is mirrored to some extent in 
the composite rest of sub-Sahara Africa (XSS) region where the economies are predominantly primary 
commodities-based with sizeable natural resources and light manufacturing sectors. Trade and services 
appear to be critical industries in all the countries. Th ey constitute at least one-third of the economies. 
Given the issue of trade facilitation and trade in services under the WTO, these sectors would be areas 
of interest in EPAs discussions.
Trade by Sectors
Tables 5 and 6 show the export and import shares by sectors of the total exports and imports of goods 
and services respectively in each of the economies. In the case of Botswana, the dominating resource 
based sector also dominates its exports. Rest of SACU has industrial based exports dominating. In the 
smaller economies such as Malawi, mainly other crops exports dominate with limited exports from agro-
processing and light manufactures. Other crops exports also dominate in the case of Tanzania, Zimbabwe 
and Uganda. Agro-processed exports are important in the case of Mozambique and as such EPAs with 
full reciprocity would most likely be a concern. Light manufacturing and industry constitute what can 
be called as the manufacturing base27 and exports from this base are clearly important for Zimbabwe as 
they add up to at least 36 per cent of total exports.
Th e import shares are also an important starting point in understanding potential implications of the 
EPAs. Table 6 shows the total imports of the various commodities into each of the countries in the 
aggregation. However, the most important imports information would be the distribution of these 
imports in terms of source and type. In other words, data on the imports from the EU into each of these 
countries would be more informative with respect to EPAs analysis particularly on the issue of reciprocity 
as this would have a bearing on the revenue implications if most of the imports are from the EU. It is clear 
however from the aggregate imports data that in general, industrial goods dominate the rest of SACU, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Other crops are also signiﬁ cant in a number of the countries, probably pointing 
to possible agricultural deﬁ cits. Agro-processed imports are substantial in Mozambique, Tanzania, and 
Zimbabwe. Generally, imports of primary commodities are not much for all the countries except for the 
category of other crops.
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Level and Structure of Protection: the Base for the EPAs
Th e level and structure of protection as captured in the GTAP database provides the initial conditions or 
the benchmark from which the trade liberalization aspects of the EPAs would have to be assessed. Th is 
benchmark in respect to trade liberalization analysis needs to be seen at two levels. Th e ﬁ rst level is the 
prevailing protection against imports from the European Union. Th e protection structure is provided in 
Table 7. Th e table shows the average applied tariﬀ s on goods imported into the country shown at the 
top of the column from the EU. It can be seen from Table 7 that on average, agro-processed and light 
manufactures from the EU are heavily protected as evidenced by the high tariﬀ s. Th is high taxation can 
be seen ﬁ rst as part of the industrial policy in these countries. It is the use of this high taxation as part of 
the industrial policy that has recently become an important area of discourse as pertains to policy space 
for developing countries. Th e second way that the high tariﬀ s on EU goods should be looked at is as a 
source of revenue. Considering that these highly taxed EU imports are in sectors that constitute main 
imports imply that under the EPAs, with full reciprocity there are possibilities of signiﬁ cant revenue 
implications in addition to trade creation and diversion issues. Th e net eﬀ ect in terms of trade expansion 
for the trade creation and diversion aspects will be determined at the empirical stage of the study. Th e 
protection data indicates that most countries are protectionist ranging from Botswana, Rest of SACU, 
Malawi, Mozambique, to Zimbabwe.
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Table 7: Ad Valorem Tariﬀ  Rates (%) on EU Imports into African Countries
BOT XSC MWI MOZ TZA ZMB ZWE XSF UGA XSS
Cereals 25.8 38.8 24.9 2.5 17.5 12.4 6.4 0.5 63.7 11.1
Vegetables 25.6 25.6 33.0 18.8 9.8 11.1 15.8 5.6 27.4 18.4
Oilseeds 38.2 38.2 39.6 2.5 13.3 0.0 4.9 12.8 63.7 9.8
Sugar 17.1 0.2 0.0 7.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.7 15.0 0.0
Cotton 34.0 17.1 42.3 2.5 39.5 0.1 0.0 0.1 14.9 3.5
Other crops 9.2 9.2 37.3 4.1 30.1 5.2 7.8 12.9 5.2 16.6
Livestock 13.0 7.3 18.9 12.9 27.2 8.2 4.9 2.4 1.0 15.0
Natural Resources 28.7 0.1 0.3 7.8 2.5 20.1 13.0 13.4 11.4 7.6
Agro Processing 67.1 71.4 32.3 30.5 21.3 16.5 42.9 29.6 18.2 22.9
Light Manufactures 25.5 12.1 24.5 21.9 23.5 12.4 21.8 26.8 15.9 20.9
Industry 23.9 7.2 17.4 9.8 17.1 10.8 14.9 27.3 13.8 14.7
Trade 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.3 0.0 3.0 0.0 1.4
Services 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.5 5.0 6.8 0.0 4.1
Average (excl. trade & 
services) 28.0 20.7 24.6 11.0 18.3 8.8 12.0 12.7 22.7 12.8
Average (incl. Trade & 
services) 23.7 17.5 20.8 9.3 15.5 9.1 10.6 11.5 19.2 11.2
Source: GTAP Database Version 5 Aggregation
Table 8 is more speciﬁ c as it gives indications on what could be expected in terms of trade creation and 
diversion. Th e table shows the average intra-Africa trade ad valorem tariﬀ s. It can be read as follows. Th e 
average applied tariﬀ s on goods into the country at the top of the column from each of the country in the 
row. For example, Botswana levies the highest import tariﬀ s (24 per cent) on Zambian goods. Th e picture 
that emerges from the intra-African tariﬀ  protection data is one of substantial intra-African trade tariﬀ  
barriers. Botswana in this case emerges as the most protective. Overall, each of the individual countries 
at the top of each column has substantial tariﬀ s towards the rest of sub-Sahara Africa. Th is essentially 
indicates that in spite of lack of disaggregated GTAP information on individual countries, the composite 
African country faces signiﬁ cant tariﬀ  barriers in the African countries. Mozambique generally levies the 
lowest tariﬀ s on trade. In addition to the question of reciprocity to EU, most of these intra-African tariﬀ s 
will have to be eliminated accentuating concerns regarding de-industrialisation and revenue shortfalls in 
majority of the countries.
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Table 8: Average Intra-Africa Trade Ad Valorem Tariﬀ s (%)
BOT XSC MWI MOZ TZA ZMB ZWE XSF UGA XSS
Botswana (BOT) 0.0 0.0 18.7 6.2 4.4 10.1 13.5 11.6 24.6 9.7
Rest of SACU (XSC) 0.0 0.0 7.6 4.3 16.9 4.7 17.2 15.4 12.3 14.3
Malawi (MWI) 22.2 18.3 0.8 5.7 10.6 10.3 13.0 10.1 12.2 7.7
Mozambique (MOZ) 20.8 14.2 9.8 0.3 11.5 11.1 12.2 10.9 20.8 6.2
Tanzania (TZA) 20.2 15.8 12.5 7.6 0.0 10.2 20.5 14.9 9.8 18.2
Zambia (ZMB) 24.2 13.9 4.1 6.5 15.1 0.5 11.8 11.9 17.7 9.4
Zimbabwe (ZWE) 23.6 17.3 16.5 5.7 12.6 9.9 1.9 13.5 16.9 13.8
Rest of S. Africa (XSF) 22.0 16.9 19.0 6.5 6.9 11.9 13.2 12.4 21.1 17.9
Uganda (UGA) 20.6 16.7 18.4 5.8 15.3 10.8 12.4 11.3 4.3 19.4
Rest of SSA (XSS) 20.2 15.2 18.2 5.9 17.5 11.1 9.5 13.0 12.9 7.8
Average tariff rate 17.4 12.8 12.6 5.4 11.1 9.1 12.5 12.5 15.3 12.4
Source: GTAP Database Version 5 Aggregation
Most of the tariﬀ  barriers protection with respect to intra-African trade discussed above is on agro-
processing and light manufactures (see Table 9). 
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Table 9: Average Commodity Tariﬀ s on Intra-African Trade (%)
BOT XSC MWI MOZ TZA ZMB ZWE XSF UGA XSS
Cereals 31.4 30.7 3.9 1.2 19.2 4.1 19.0 3.1 32.8 7.6
Vegetables 22.8 22.8 23.3 7.3 14.6 16.4 21.5 13.4 47.9 19.9
Oilseeds 34.0 34.0 30.8 7.8 11.9 0.0 0.6 22.8 38.7 18.4
Sugar 11.4 0.1 0.0 5.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.8 13.3 0.0
Cotton 15.1 9.5 22.7 0.3 3.3 0.6 0.3 0.0 7.8 3.6
Other crops 8.2 8.2 22.7 9.0 19.1 13.0 32.8 23.8 13.7 37.4
Livestock 5.7 5.1 2.0 4.7 15.6 14.3 1.5 7.8 1.8 12.3
Natural Resources 20.5 0.7 2.5 5.7 8.6 20.0 8.8 10.8 7.5 10.3
Agro Processing 57.2 56.2 37.7 7.7 27.9 13.5 26.5 21.0 14.4 19.7
Light Manufactures 21.9 13.3 24.1 17.5 26.0 17.0 33.4 22.0 15.9 17.1
Industry 22.8 4.9 10.6 11.1 13.8 7.7 27.4 23.3 20.4 17.8
Trade 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.3 0.0 2.8 0.0 1.2
Services 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.3 6.3 5.2 0.0 3.0
In the absence of reciprocity with the EU, there is potential for trade creation in the African trade if these 
tariﬀ  barriers were to be eliminated28. However, with reciprocity, trade creation for most eﬃ  cient African 
producers is not likely to be maximised because of the competitive advantage of the EU producers. In the 
area of primary production, vegetables and other crops are also heavily protected. Similarly, cereals are 
protected under the intra-African trade. Given that primary production is labour intensive, trade creation 
and specialisation possibilities in these sectors exist under an EPA. 
Th e Partial Equilibrium Modelling Framework – the WITS/SMART Model
Rationale for a Partial Equilibrium Model
It was argued in the introductory chapter that trade policy analysis is more robust when undertaken 
within a general equilibrium modelling framework. Th is can be seen as the ﬁ rst-best option as general 
equilibrium models, not only measure the ﬁ rst-round eﬀ ects of simulated changes, but also the second-
round eﬀ ects which include inter-industry eﬀ ects and macroeconomic adjustments. However, as has 
been indicated in the discussions on the GTAP modelling and database frameworks, majority of the 
African countries are not individually captured in that methodology due to lack of data disaggregation. 
Only a few which have been presented in the previous section as individual stand-alone countries while 
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the rest are part of composites of countries viz. the rest of SACU, rest of Southern Africa, and Rest of sub-
Saharan Africa. Consequently, the partial equilibrium modelling framework lends itself as a second-best 
option for those countries that are not captured individually in the GTAP database. Th is section therefore 
describes the partial equilibrium modelling methodology that was used in the study to complement the 
GTAP results. Th e main distinction that should be noted at the outset is that as a partial equilibrium 
model, the inter-sectoral implications (second-round eﬀ ects) of a trade policy change are not taken into 
account, as is the case in the general equilibrium model. Similarly, the inter-regional implications such as 
within a REC setting are also ignored in a partial equilibrium framework. Th e only point of convergence 
of the partial and general equilibrium models is that it is still possible within a partial equilibrium model 
to analyse the trade policy eﬀ ects on trade creation and diversion, welfare and even on tariﬀ  revenues 
while holding everything else constant.
Milner et al. (2002) provides a simple analytical framework explaining the theory behind partial 
equilibrium modelling and notes that to adequately capture the interactions between sectors and 
elasticities of substitution between factors, and to simulate dynamic eﬀ ects in their EPA study between 
the EU and the East African Community, a general equilibrium model would be desirable. However, 
due to scarcity of individual and regional CGE models for developing countries then partial equilibrium 
models would be alternative choices. Milner et al. (2002) also raise a valid observation that the database 
for general equilibrium models lacks the commodity detail to take account of the speciﬁ c sensitive 
and special products that are of interest to both the sub-Saharan African countries and the EU in this 
particular case. Despite its shortcomings, a partial equilibrium framework is more suitable as it allows 
the utilization of widely available trade data at the appropriate level of detail to capture the principle of 
special and diﬀ erential treatment in the simulation analysis. It however remains true that although partial 
equilibrium models have drawbacks, as a modelling approach they have the advantage of working at very 
ﬁ ne levels of details such as at tariﬀ  line level. 
Th e WITS/SMART Model
For the purposes of this study, it is proposed that the WITS/SMART model will be the applied partial 
equilibrium framework. Th e World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) brings together various databases 
ranging from bilateral trade, commodity trade ﬂ ows and various levels and types of protection. WITS 
also integrate analytical tools that support simulation analysis. Th e SMART simulation model is one of 
the analytical tools in WITS for simulation purposes. SMART contains in-built analytical modules that 
support trade policy analysis such as eﬀ ects of multilateral tariﬀ  cuts, preferential trade liberalization and 
ad hoc tariﬀ  changes. Th e underlying theory behind this analytical tool is the standard partial equilibrium 
framework that considers dynamic eﬀ ects constant. Like any partial equilibrium model, it has these 
strong assumptions allowing the trade policy analysis to be undertaken a country at a time. In spite of 
this weakness, WITS/SMART can help estimate trade creation, diversion, welfare and revenue eﬀ ects for 
those countries whose data is available.
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Trade creation
Th e underlying theory is summarized below for the estimation of the trade ﬂ ows and revenue eﬀ ects. 
Th e exposition of the WITS/SMART theory is summarized from Laird and Yeats (1986). Trade creation 
captures the trade expanding aspects of liberalization that leads to the displacement of ineﬃ  cient 
producers in a given preferential trading area (a free trade area for instance). It is assumed that there 
is full transmission of price changes when tariﬀ  or non-tariﬀ  distortions (ad valorem equivalents) are 
reduced or eliminated. Laird and Yeats (1986) derive clearly the equation that can be used to estimate the 
trade creation eﬀ ects. Th e derivation begins with the following basic trade model composed of simpliﬁ ed 
import demand and export supply functions and an equilibrating identity:
A simpliﬁ ed import demand function for country j from country k of commodity i:
  
        (1)
Th e export supply function of commodity i of country k can be simpliﬁ ed as:
  
     (2)
Th e equilibrium in the trade between the two countries is the standard partial equilibrium equation:
  
     (3)
In a free trade environment, the domestic price29 of commodity i in country j from country k would 
change with the change in an ad valorem tariﬀ  as follows:
  
    (4)
To derive the trade creation formula, following Laird and Yeats (1986), the price equation (4) is totally 
diﬀ erentiated to get:
  
   (5)
Equations (4) and (5) are then substituted into the elasticity of import demand equation30 to get:
41
  
  (6)
From the identity in equation (3),
   
can be used to derive the following expression for elasticity of export supply:
  
which when used in equation 6, allows the computation of the trade creation eﬀ ect. From equation 
(3) the trade creation eﬀ ect is equivalent to exporting country k’s growth of exports of commodity i to 
country j:
  
  (7)
If , then equation (7) can be simpliﬁ ed as follows:
  
   (8)
where TC
ijk
 is the sum of trade created in millions of dollars over i commodities aﬀ ected by tariﬀ  change 
and is the elasticity of import demand for commodity i in the importing country from the relevant 
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trading partner. M
ijk
 is the current level of import demand of the given commodity i. and represent 
tariﬀ  rates for commodity i at the initial and end periods respectively. Trade creation then depends on the 
current level of imports, the import demand elasticity and the relative tariﬀ  change.
Trade diversion
Trade diversion as opposed to trade creation can expand or contract trade globally. Trade diversion is 
the phenomenon that occurs in a free trade area for example whereby eﬃ  cient producers from outside 
the free trade area are displaced by less eﬃ  cient producers in the preferential area. Consider an EPA 
between ECOWAS and EU for instance. Trade diversion would occur if as a result of the establishment 
of the EPA more eﬃ  cient suppliers from the rest of the world (ROW) into ECOWAS are displaced by 
ineﬃ  cient producers from the EU. Assuming that such an EPA is formed which leads to reduction of 
tariﬀ s facing the EU without any changes in the tariﬀ s facing the ROW exporters; the theory underlying 
the measurement of trade diversion in SMART is also explained in Laird and Yeats (1986). To see the 
derivation clearly, ﬁ rst the expression for elasticity of substitution is given. Th e elasticity of substitution 
can be expressed as the percentage change in relative shares of imports from two diﬀ erent sources due to 
a one per cent change in the relative prices of the same product from these two sources:
  
   (9)
where k denotes imports from EU and K denotes imports from the rest of the World. Equation (9) can 
be expanded, and through substitutions and rearrangements be used to obtain the expression for trade 
diversion, which is expressed as:
   (10)
Equation (10) can be simpliﬁ ed to the case of an EPA. Th e relative price movement terms in the equation 
as noted in Laird and Yeats (1986) capture the movement due to changes in tariﬀ s or the ad valorem 
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incidence of non-tariﬀ  distortions for the EU and the ROW. Th erefore, the trade diverted to the EU in 
the EPA,  can be captured by reducing equation (10) above as follows: 
   (11)
Equation (11) shows the additional EU imports into the African EPA conﬁ gured region such as ECOWAS 
over and above the increase in ECOWAS imports as a result of trade creation. Th ere isn’t necessarily a net 
increase in imports into ECOWAS as this involves the displacement of ROW imports into ECOWAS. 
 and  are the current imports into the African REC conﬁ guration for EPA purposes from 
the EU and ROW respectively. and are respectively the end and initial periods import tariﬀ s 
imposed on EU imports in the destination REC with . is the elasticity of substitution 
between EU and ROW imports into the concerned country or REC. Trade diversion then depends on 
the current level of imports from the EU and ROW, the percentage change (reduction in this case) of 
tariﬀ s facing EU imports with those for ROW remaining unchanged and the elasticity of substitution of 
the imports from the two sources. Th e higher the value of the elasticity of substitution, the greater will 
be the trade diversion eﬀ ects.
Trade expansion
Adding the trade creation and diversion derives the total eﬀ ect on trade. As indicated in Laird and Yeats 
(1986), the summation in equations (8) and (10) for an importing country can be done across products 
and/or across sources. It is also possible to sum the results across a group of importers for single or groups 
of products as well as for single sources of supply or groups of suppliers.
Th e revenue eﬀ ect
Th e quantiﬁ cation of the revenue eﬀ ect using WITS/SMART model is simple. In theory, the tariﬀ  revenue 
is given as the product of the tax rate (tariﬀ  rate in this case) and the tax base (the value of imports). Th us, 
before the change in the ad valorem incidence of the trade barriers, the revenue is given as:
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After the change in the tariﬀ  rate, the new revenue collection will be given by:
  
Th e revenue loss as a result of the implementation of an EPA would then be the net eﬀ ect between R
1
and R
0
 which is the same as:
     (12)
Th e welfare eﬀ ect
Th e WITS/SMART model estimation of welfare eﬀ ects is quite simple. Th is is unlike the equivalent 
variations measurement in general equilibrium models. Essentially, the welfare eﬀ ect is mainly ascribed 
to the consumer beneﬁ ts in the importing country as a result of lower import prices31. Th is allows them 
to substitute more expensive domestic or imported products with the cheaper imports that are aﬀ ected 
by the relevant tariﬀ  reduction. Increased imports leads to a net welfare gain that can be thought as the 
increase in consumer welfare and is measured as follows:
         (13)
Th e coeﬃ  cient of 0.5 captures the average between the ad valorem incidence of the trade barriers before 
and after their elimination/reduction. Equation (13) assumes that the elasticity of export supply is 
inﬁ nite. If this is not the case, the import prices in the importing countries fall by less than the full 
reduction in trade barriers. Th erefore, while the equation can be used to measure welfare eﬀ ect, it is no 
longer a representation of consumer surplus alone but has some element of producer surplus (see Laird 
and Yeats 1986).
Th e WITS Database
WITS database comes from various sources. Th e external trade statistics comprise of UN COMTRADE, 
UNCTAD TRAINS and the WTO Integrated Data Base (IDB). Th e tariﬀ s data is derived from 
UNCTAD TRAINS, WTO IDB and WTO Consolidated Tariﬀ  Schedule Data Base (CTS). Th e non-
tariﬀ  measures are compiled from UNCTAD TRAINS database.
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Potential Economic and Welfare Impacts of EPAs on African Economies: General 
Equilibrium Results
Introduction
Th e economic models employed to quantify the potential implications of the trade aspects of the EPAs were 
discussed in detail in the previous chapter. As indicated in that discussion, both the general equilibrium 
and partial equilibrium modelling frameworks emerged as the suitable tools that could be used to 
quantify the likely impacts of the EPAs. Th e general equilibrium modelling framework it was noted, has 
the advantage of allowing the analysis to indicate the potential impacts on the industry structure in the 
African economies, a feature that is not present in the partial equilibrium model. Moreover, the general 
equilibrium analysis also allows for strong feedback mechanisms not only among economic sectors but 
also across and among countries. It is also not possible under a partial equilibrium analytical framework 
to alter trade policy instruments in more than one country (region) at the same time. In fact, the partial 
equilibrium analysis depends mainly on the ceteris paribus assumption. 
Th e General Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, the general equilibrium analysis results are discussed. Th e general equilibrium analysis was 
undertaken using Version 5.4 of the GTAP database. Th e motivation for the analysis is what implications 
EPAs are likely to have on African economies. Th e aggregation scheme for the analysis comprises of seven 
regions: North America (NAM); Japan; Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA); China; Rest of the World (ROW); 
EU-15; and EU-10 (CEEC). Th ere are 16 sectors in each of these regions.
Th ree scenarios were investigated, each addressing a possible option that the EPAs negotiations are likely to 
be faced with. It needs to be noted that the results, as presented here, are more indicative of the directions 
of change on the economic variables. While the magnitudes are also important, it is important to qualify 
at this early stage that the robustness of the changes indicated have not been analysed in any statistical 
way. Nevertheless, the results do broadly indicate the direction of change and what policymakers could 
expect from their decisions on the African countries’ position in the EPAs negotiations. Th e discussion 
of the general equilibrium results starts by presenting how a new baseline was developed upon which the 
changes resulting from the various scenarios were evaluated.
Generating the baseline scenario for EPAs
Th e Cotonou Partnership Agreement speciﬁ es January 1, 2008 as the date by which the EPAs should take 
eﬀ ect. Before that date, various international agreements will have been implemented with important 
implications on the global economic landscape. It is therefore important that these changes be captured 
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in the baseline upon which implication of the trade aspects of the EPAs are to be assessed. Th e main 
events that will precede the launch of the EPAs and hence likely to aﬀ ect how they impact on the 
economies and welfare of sub-Saharan Africa include the following: the enlargement of the European 
Union; the implementation of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing as part of the MFA phase out; 
the implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreement on domestic support and export subsidies; the 
full accession of China into the WTO; and the conclusion of the Doha Development Round. Th e Doha 
Round outcome is currently not clear how it will likely impact on the EPAs. Th erefore, it has not been 
built into the baseline of the EPAs as yet. As for the other four main issues, the following discussions 
explains how they were incorporated into the baseline:
Enlargement of the EU: An enlarged EU will ultimately be the trading bloc that the African countries 
will have to face by the time the EPAs come into eﬀ ect. A harmonized and integrated trade policy is 
expected to be in place by the time the EPAs come into force. In order to capture this integration, the 
following trade policy changes are reﬂ ected in the baseline. First, all tariﬀ s and export subsidies as well 
as non-tariﬀ  barriers between the EU-15 and the new ten members are abolished. Second, trade barriers 
among the 10 new EU members have also been eliminated. Finally, all sectors in the EU-10 are given the 
same level of protection against the rest of the world as found in the EU-15 at the time of the accession. 
Th is means that some of the tariﬀ  rates that the new EU members charge third countries have been 
increased or reduced to the existing levels of the old EU members. Th e relevant percent changes eﬀ ected 
on the prevailing tariﬀ s are shown on Table 10 below.
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Table 10: Required change (%) on prevailing CEEC tariﬀ s for a harmonized enlarged EU CET
NAM Japan SSA China ROW
Cereals 169.79 251.25 22.35 128.93 181.44
Vegetables -16.18 -9.38 20.83 -22.46 -29.61
Oilseeds -100.00 -100.00 -100.00 -100.00 -100.00
Sugar 1521.94 1576.00 1521.94 1511.54 1598.65
Cotton -100.00 -100.00 -100.00 -100.00 -100.00
Other Crops -77.04 -69.00 -71.82 -80.00 -70.75
Livestock 7.33 23.23 24.07 18.83 50.00
Animal products -75.74 -70.67 -63.79 -78.69 -69.29
Fishing 83.67 1.4* 700.00 52.17 -12.20
Other Natural resources -86.96 -95.24 -100.00 -86.21 -33.33
Agro-processing -24.92 43.06 -8.80 -6.73 16.27
Textiles -22.33 -8.14 159.52 -25.78 -2.15
Clothing 16.67 31.46 112.28 -42.49 -29.41
Low tech industries -57.63 -35.21 -61.19 -44.06 -33.33
Medium tech industries -47.95 -38.67 16.67 -36.90 -53.06
Heavy industries -60.98 -49.51 -66.67 -54.37 -69.47
Source: GTAP 5.4 and authors’ computations; * Tariﬀ  rate of 1.4% on ﬁ sh imports from Japan
Elimination of MFA quotas (implementation of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing): It is expected 
that the phasing out of the multiﬁ bre agreement on textiles and clothing will have signiﬁ cant implications 
for developing countries. It was therefore important to capture the likely eﬀ ects of the removal of the 
MFA into the baseline. Th e elimination of the MFA was captured through elimination of the export tax 
equivalents of the textile and clothing quotas in the developed countries markets in particular.
Uruguay Round Agreement implementation: Th e European Union has traditionally used domestic 
support and export subsidies especially in agriculture. While the Doha Round negotiations are expected 
to have an agreement that will have dramatic impacts on how these two instruments are applied, there are 
still outstanding issues from the Uruguay Round. Th e EPAs baseline captures the 20 percent reductions 
for developed countries domestic support. A rate of 13 percent was applied for the developing countries. 
In the case of the agricultural export subsidies, the baseline implements the 36 percent and 24 percent 
reductions agreed at the Uruguay Round for developed and developing countries respectively.
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China accession to the WTO: Th e full accession of China to the WTO is expected to have important 
implications for both developed and developing countries. At full accession, all WTO members will be 
expected to impose import tariﬀ s on Chinese goods on an MFN basis. Th is was captured in the baseline 
by reducing tariﬀ s on Chinese imports above the highest rate currently charged by importing country on 
each commodity32.
After the construction of the new baseline, three scenarios were designed to assess the possible implications 
of the EPAs on African economies. As already observed, the scenarios are based on a hypothetical SSA-EU 
EPA that is motivated by the objective of an African Economic Community. Th e Cotonou Partnership 
Agreement presented an opportunity that could advance the African economic integration if the EPAs 
were to be negotiated on a continental rather than the RECs basis. But given that the negotiations are 
taking place at regional level, and since not many African countries are individually disaggregated in the 
GTAP database, the optimal way to look at implications on the economies of the African countries is 
through the SSA-EU Economic Partnership Agreement. It is only in the case of SADC where a more 
detailed country level analysis can be undertaken. Th e scenarios that are described below are for a typical 
African country, based on the SSA composite region derived from the GTAP database.
Scenarios for the EU-SSA Economic Partnership Agreements
Scenario 1 – SSA reciprocation of EU preferential tariﬀ s: One of the key principles of the EPAs is 
reciprocity. Th is scenario assesses the EPAs implications in the case of SSA reciprocating on the favourable 
tariﬀ s it is currently receiving from the EU. Th e scenario addresses the question of whether full reciprocity 
is feasible under the EPAs. Th e Lomé Conventions provided for duty free access for 95 percent of the 
tariﬀ  lines of the ACP member countries. But as can be seen from the Table 11 below based on the GTAP 
Version 5.4 protection data, the EU is still shown to levy duties on SSA goods albeit at generally lower 
rates compared to what the SSA countries impose on EU goods. Th e indicated protection rates by the 
EU on SSA goods could be explained in three ways. Firstly, the UNCTAD TRAINS tariﬀ  data might 
not reﬂ ect fully the preferential rates accorded to African countries. Secondly, due to aggregation from 
the original thousands of tariﬀ  lines in TRAINS to the GTAP level of aggregation, it is possible that the 
ﬁ ve percent of tariﬀ  lines excluded from the Lomé Conventions (besides possibly being of more interest 
to Africa) ﬁ nd themselves in the 16 sectors used in this analysis as shown in Table 11. And thirdly, the 
inclusion of the additional ten new EU members may have contributed to the non-zero tariﬀ s observed 
for SSA. 
49
Table 11: Percent change on SSA tariﬀ s for reciprocity purposes.
EU tariffs rates 
on SSA
SSA tariffs rates 
on EU
SSA reciprocation 
(% change)
Cereals 41.6 10.5 296.2
Vegetables 14.5 17.1 -15.2
Oilseeds 0.0 9.6 -100.0
Sugar 251.4 1.5 16660.0
Cotton 0.0 3.6 -100.0
Other crops 3.1 16.1 -80.7
Livestock 36.6 11.7 212.8
Animal products 6.3 9.9 -36.4
Fishing 12.0 9.3 29.0
Energy 0.0 9.5 -100.0
Other natural resources 0.0 13.1 -100.0
Agro-processed goods 39.4 23.9 64.9
Textiles 10.9 16.4 -33.5
Clothing 12.1 29.6 -59.1
Low tech industries 2.6 23.5 -88.9
Medium tech industries 2.1 15.4 -86.4
Heavy industries 1.4 15.8 -91.1
Source: GTAP V.5.4 and authors’ simulation baseline
Th erefore, in order to capture the reciprocal principle33 without necessarily thinking of an FTA, all the 
tariﬀ s by SSA that are above those levied by EU on SSA sourced imports are reduced to the EU level. 
In other words, a key assumption in this simulation is that the EPAs aim to establish partnerships that 
are compatible with the WTO but not necessarily to create a free trade area between EU and African 
countries, which would in itself require full trade liberalization34. For the sectors cereals, sugar, livestock, 
ﬁ shing, and agro-processing, whose tariﬀ s are lower in SSA that in the EU, no change is eﬀ ected in this 
scenario. Th e main justiﬁ cation for this treatment is that, in the case of agro-processing sector, there are 
the beef and sugar protocols that are part of the aggregated. Another reason is that these sectors reﬂ ect 
problem of tariﬀ  peaks and escalation. Th e commodity protocols, tariﬀ  peaks and escalations, non-tariﬀ  
barriers questions while being part of the EPAs negotiations are not part of the full reciprocity simulation. 
From Table 11, reciprocation will be an issue mainly in sectors such as textiles and clothing; industrial 
sectors; and most primary producing sectors.
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Scenario 2 – Deeper regional integration without reciprocity: Th e Cotonou Partnership Agreement also 
hopes to achieve deeper integration in participating ACP states. One might therefore ask would deeper 
integration within sub-Saharan Africa be acceptable to a benevolent EU as a substitute for immediate full 
reciprocity by SSA countries? In this scenario, the principle of deeper regional integration within Africa 
is investigated further. Essentially, the rationale behind this second scenario is that one reason why most 
African countries have not been able to exploit the preferences under Lomé Agreement is the lack of 
supply capacity. Th us, these countries would require suﬃ  cient time for them to build this capacity. Since 
the EPAs must eventually be WTO compliant, this scenario presents an option where the SSA countries 
liberalize trade among themselves without immediate reciprocation on the preferences granted by the 
EU on the understanding that the EU is in a position to agree to EPAs that provide enough time to the 
African countries to build their capacities so that they can eventually be able to compete with the EU 
producers and exporters. Th e time before the reciprocation by the SSA countries will begin is not captured 
in this scenario due to the static nature of the model, but the point is that deeper regional integration35
within SSA will enable the producers and exporters in the region to build capacities as they compete 
among themselves before facing EU producers and exporters when the reciprocity principle kicks in. Th is 
scenario is also premised on the desire to increase the market size that African producers and exporters face 
within the continent. Due to small domestic markets, African industries might not be able to exploit the 
economies of scale that could aﬀ ord possibilities for the building of competitive industries.
Scenario 3 – EU-SSA Free Trade Area: Scenarios 1 and 2 considered the option of establishing a 
partnership between the EU and SSA that is not necessarily a free trade area. Th us, in scenario 1, the 
assumption is that in order for the partnership to be WTO compliant, the SSA countries must reciprocate 
on the preferential treatment that they are currently receiving from the EU. Th e EU takes no action on 
the commodity protocols and other non-tariﬀ  barriers and does not deal with market access issues related 
to tariﬀ  peaks and escalation. Th e second scenario’s objective was to provide room for capacity building 
within the SSA regions before they can reciprocate on the preferences that the EU has been according 
the region’s exports. In this third scenario, the option for a EU-SSA Free Trade Agreement is explored. 
Should the EPAs aim for just partnerships that do not address issues such as the commodity protocols, 
non-tariﬀ  barriers, tariﬀ  peaks and escalations fully or should they aim for WTO compliance that is based 
on free trade between the two sub-regions? In this scenario therefore, all the trade barriers between the 
SSA and EU in both directions are eliminated.
Results from EU-SSA EPA Scenarios
Macroeconomic, trade and welfare: aggregate eﬀ ects
Th e income and trade eﬀ ects of the three scenarios are shown in Table 12. Th e results for SSA are also 
presented in Figure 1 for comparison purposes of the three scenarios. Th e results indicate the aggregate 
impacts full reciprocity and deeper regional integration principles of the EPAs are likely to have. It is 
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clear based on the implication on the volume of GDP that other than the EU, all other regions stand 
to lose from full reciprocity. SSA’s income marginally declines. Th e eﬀ ect of SSA’s reciprocation is more 
pronounced in the eﬀ ects on trade and welfare as measured through equivalent variation. SSA’s imports 
grow faster than its exports and combined with the deterioration in the terms of trade, its balance of 
trade worsens by US$1,868 million. Th is can be seen to represent a major adjustment cost for the SSA. 
In deed, in spite of the marginal deterioration in the terms of trade for other regions, it is only SSA 
that suﬀ ers from a poorer balance of trade position under full reciprocity. Th e poor GDP performance, 
worsening trade balance, and deteriorating terms of trade result in loss of welfare for SSA region from 
EPAs’ reciprocal principle. Full reciprocity, at least in the short-run stands to lead to losses both in terms 
economic and welfare outcomes for SSA. 
Trade barriers among African countries evidently limit the realization of the economic and welfare gains 
of intra-African trade (scenario 2). Th e elimination of the tariﬀ  barriers and the tariﬀ  equivalent of non-
tariﬀ  barriers have the potential of raising incomes and welfare in the SSA region. As the Figures 1 and 
2 indicate, a scenario where the SSA countries liberalize trade among themselves in an EPA without 
immediate reciprocity, results in gains both in terms of economic expansion and improved welfare. 
While the change in balance of trade still indicates deterioration, there are positive gains in all the other 
economic indicators in the SSA region. A comparison of the outcomes from full reciprocity and deeper 
regional integration strongly indicate that an EPA that expects immediate or full reciprocity would be 
disadvantageous to SSA countries. Without full reciprocity but deepened regional integration, SSA 
countries would experience positive GDP growths from the EPAs. Th e terms of trade, which under full 
reciprocity register deterioration, improve in a deepened regional integration scenario.
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Table 12: Income, trade and welfare eﬀ ects of EPAs
GDP (%) Imports 
(%)
Exports 
(%)
ToT (%) BoT (US$ 
mln)
EV (US$ 
mln)
Scenario 1: Full reciprocity
EU15 0.0044 0.1095 0.05 0.0565 52.7352 1748.8019
CEEC 0.0019 -0.01 0.0211 -0.0058 23.4368 -2.5357
NAM -0.0001 -0.0317 0.0207 -0.0103 529.9121 -83.1632
Japan -0.0005 -0.0574 0.0493 -0.0214 366.1649 -45.8012
SSA -0.0129 4.4775 2.3152 -0.5477 -1868.361 -563.9485
China -0.0018 -0.0671 -0.0115 -0.0282 45.5154 -57.3101
ROW -0.003 -0.0864 -0.0032 -0.0406 850.6011 -921.4965
Scenario 2: Deeper intra-Africa integration
EU15 -0.0004 -0.0082 0.0045 -0.0048 191.6676 -150.4622
CEEC -0.0005 -0.0043 0.0049 -0.0018 11.8501 -5.3033
NAM 0 -0.0078 0.0092 -0.0042 150.7274 -58.1692
Japan -0.0001 -0.0106 0.0186 -0.0083 98.9025 -45.1652
SSA 0.4916 2.4112 1.2906 0.2996 -629.7655 1204.2651
China -0.0002 -0.0113 0.0016 -0.0056 15.5255 -16.4879
ROW -0.0002 -0.0045 0.0014 0.0024 161.0926 27.1114
Scenario 3: EU-SSA Free Trade Area
EU15 0.0079 0.2245 0.2331 0.0194 934.9118 1116.3458
CEEC 0.0030 -0.0696 0.1245 -0.0829 169.0720 -131.7854
NAM -0.0003 -0.0780 0.0751 -0.0349 1437.1685 -438.9070
Japan -0.0013 -0.1163 0.1579 -0.0693 928.5612 -313.1068
SSA 3.3890 18.2476 8.8278 1.8336 -5484.2998 8028.7661
China -0.0032 -0.1236 0.0051 -0.0557 144.5395 -144.1505
ROW -0.0040 -0.1205 0.0072 -0.0327 1870.0596 -883.5765
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Figure 1: Income and trade eﬀ ects on Sub-Saharan Africa
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Income and Trade Effects of EPAs Scenarios
A very telling result from the three scenarios is that the SSA region would reap the largest gains from 
EPAs that take the form of FTAs rather than partnerships that do not address all the trade barriers with 
EU. Th e SSA’s GDP would expand by an additional 3.4 percent above the base in an FTA agreement. 
Th e terms of trade for the region in the FTA would also be most favourable. Th is result suggests that 
unless the EPAs are aim to include even what are perceived to be sensitive sectors in the EU, the African 
economies are unlikely to beneﬁ t. An ambitious liberalization of the EU with unrestricted market access 
comes out clearly as the best way that the EPAs can hope to lock in beneﬁ ts for SSA countries. Hence, 
unrestricted market access into the EU market even with reciprocation by the SSA countries can derive 
beneﬁ ts to the latter. Th ese results suggests that the exports that are of interest to African countries are 
more likely to be best handled in an unrestricted market situation even with reciprocity rather than 
having sensitive sectors in the eyes of the EU being included in the EPAs agreements. It is important 
to look the results of the unrestricted market access also in the context of scenario 2. Deeper regional 
integration without reciprocation has beneﬁ ts for Africa. Locking in these beneﬁ ts by allowing a lead 
time for African countries and then pursuing the unrestricted market access option suggest the most 
beneﬁ cial sequencing for the African countries for them to maximize gains from the EPAs. Whereas 
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welfare gains and the balance of trade outcomes are more positive in an integrated SSA region that does 
not have to immediately reciprocate on the EU preferences over an EPA that simply has full reciprocity, 
it is an FTA that provides the highest gains of over US$8 billion to the region. Th is gain will however 
come at a major macroeconomic adjustment cost in terms of the balance of trade.
Figure 2: Impacts of EPAs on SSA balance of trade and welfare
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Industry structure in SSA: EPAs options
Majority of sub-Saharan African countries have stated industrial policies that endeavour to achieve more 
industrialization and diversiﬁ cation in their economies. In deed, explanations that are given for the dismal 
performance of SSA in global trade are lack of supply capacities and exports diversiﬁ cation. As a result, 
the impact of EPAs on the industrial structure of these countries is important. Table 13 indicates the 
likely impacts of the three EPAs options on industries in SSA. Deeper regional integration in SSA could 
potentially provide the space for diversiﬁ cation in production and exports to take place. Unlike in the 
case of full reciprocity scenario where SSA region will specialize in production of primary commodities, 
deeper regional integration allows the emergence of high value-added non-primary commodity producing 
sections. Th e region has the potential to develop production capacities in sectors that require low- and 
medium-technologies and even in heavy industries. But it is in textiles and clothing, sectors likely to 
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provide solid foundation for industrialization and diversiﬁ cation that will beneﬁ t most from deepened 
trade in the region. Th ese sectors will see their outputs expand by 1.2 and 2.7 percent compared to 
contractions if the region was to fully reciprocate to the EU lower tariﬀ s. Another important result is the 
positive result for some primary producing sectors that could otherwise decline under full reciprocity. 
Th ese include sectors such as vegetables, oilseeds, livestock and animal products. 
Table 13: Industry outputs in Sub-Saharan Africa (percent change in output from the base)
Full reciprocity Deeper integration Free trade area
Cereals 0.0213 0.5554 7.7333
Vegetables -0.2063 0.2536 4.8533
Oilseeds -0.0199 0.2588 5.0238
Sugar 0.0423 0.4369 12.8798
Cotton 0.6788 -0.0293 -3.2957
Other Crops 0.5084 -0.0616 0.9048
Livestock -0.2478 0.4614 5.5269
Animal prods -0.0189 0.4063 4.9162
Fishing -0.1151 0.2612 3.4621
Energy 0.1458 -0.2934 -1.9289
Other Natural resources 0.2248 -0.1383 -1.7175
Agro-processing 0.0885 0.4376 12.482
Textiles -0.6989 1.3384 2.3047
Clothing -2.6639 2.7493 9.1321
Low tech industries -4.8511 1.2875 -5.0218
Medium tech industries -3.0865 1.0426 -2.9961
Heavy industries -3.2136 1.2986 -10.7966
A comparison between the three options is also shown in Figures 3 and 4 for the primary and manufacturing 
sectors in SSA. Considering ﬁ rst the primary sectors, the full reciprocity scenario is unfavourable for SSA 
even in these sectors. But in the cases of deeper intra-SSA integration and the FTA, sectors concerned 
with primary commodities production other those of extraction in nature expand. 
Clearly, majority of SSA industries will witness a reduction in their output under full reciprocity. 
Th is contraction will be more serious in those sectors that are perceived to be the foundations for 
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industrialization, viz. low-tech and mid-tech industries; heavy industry; clothing; and textiles. Other than 
cotton, other crops, energy, natural resources and agro-processing industries where there are marginal 
expansions, SSA industrial sectors stand to contract signiﬁ cantly. Th us, de-industrialization is likely to be 
a major outcome if the EPAs reciprocity principle is implemented through full reciprocation. Th e only 
industrial sector that is likely to survive under such EPAs is agro-processing and this is because no tariﬀ  
change was eﬀ ected for this sector under this scenario as earlier noted. Th e outcome on the industrial 
structure from full reciprocity is replicated somehow but on larger magnitudes in the FTA option. De-
industrialization is a clear possibility even for the low-tech industrial sector. Nonetheless, under an FTA, 
the SSA region’s agro-processing, textiles and clothing sectors expand substantially. 
Figure 3: Impacts on primary sectors in SSA as a result of the EPAs
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SSA countries have potential to develop an industrial base as Figure 4 indicates. But it needs to be 
reiterated that this outcome needs to be put in the context of the other two scenarios. If there is fully 
reciprocity without the exports of interest to SSA countries being considered in the liberalization, then 
Africa will stand to lose its existing industries. On the other hand, the capacity for the current industries 
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in SSA to withstand competition can be strengthened through enlarged African markets if the intra-
African trade barriers were to be eliminated. Th erefore, the industrial base that appears possible under 
the FTA scenario with the EU is realisable if the sequencing of the implementations of the EPA was such 
that the SSA countries have room to build competitiveness, broaden supply capacities and diversify their 
industries. Th e implications on the industrial structure of SSA countries then suggest that the best way 
to conﬁ gure the EPAs is by ﬁ rst undertaking deep integration within the African market and thereafter 
have unrestricted market access to the EU market with reciprocity.
Figure 4: Implications of EPAs options on SSA countries industrial structure
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Demand for and returns to factors of productions
Th e three EPAs options would have varying levels of adjustment costs in terms of endowments utilisation. 
In SSA region, this adjustment would especially be of interest in the case of employment demand and the 
returns to labour. Th e adjustments likely to take place in terms of demand for unskilled labour in selected 
sectors, under a full reciprocity scenario is indicated in Figure 5. Th e demand for unskilled labour in the 
sectors where there is more value adding, that is, in the manufacturing industries contracts sharply. But, 
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there is likely to be increased demand in the use of unskilled workers in sectors such as cotton, other 
crops, energy, natural resources and agro-processing. Th e contractions out of textiles and clothing and 
other industrial sectors could prove to be too costly, as returns to labour tend to be higher in these sectors 
than in the primary sectors.
Figure 5: Demand for unskilled labour in SSA (volume terms) in a full reciprocity scenario
-60
-50
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
H
ea
vy
in
d
M
ed
te
ch
in
d
Lo
w
te
ch
in
d
C
lo
th
in
g
Te
xt
ile
s
A
gr
op
ro
c
oN
at
es
ou
rc
es
E
ne
rg
y
Li
ve
st
oc
k
oC
ro
ps
C
ot
to
n
Ve
ge
ta
bl
es
%
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 v
ol
um
e
Volume change in unskilled labour employment: full reciprocity option
59
Table 14: Demand for endowment factors in primary and manufacturing sectors in SSA under a 
EU-SSA FTA (percent deviation from baseline)
Land Unskilled 
Labour
Skilled 
Labour
Capital Natural 
Resources
Cereals 2.3449 9.0177 7.2315 7.0138 0.0368
Vegetables 0.0548 6.0083 4.2714 4.0597 0.0251
Oilseeds 0.2072 6.2081 4.4679 4.2558 0.0259
Sugar 6.4283 14.4232 12.5484 12.3198 0.0572
Cotton -6.436 -2.4318 -4.0304 -4.2253 -0.0098
Other Crops -3.0492 1.9554 0.2849 0.0813 0.0087
Livestock 0.6094 6.7356 4.9868 4.7736 0.0279
Animal products 0.1196 6.0933 4.355 4.1431 0.0254
Fishing 1.9935 7.5047 6.016 5.8343 0.0366
Energy -5.4413 -1.8293 -3.1887 -3.3547 -0.0086
Other natural resources -4.6468 -0.8387 -2.2118 -2.3794 -0.0036
Agro-processing -4.2477 19.79 10.7919 9.7325 0.0167
Textiles -9.7968 7.6427 -1.41 -2.4699 0.0064
Clothing -6.9228 15.5495 5.8319 4.6941 0.012
Low tech industries -12.7499 -0.1578 -8.5545 -9.5376 0.0004
Med tech industries -11.2978 3.6367 -5.079 -6.0995 0.0034
Heavy industries -14.7534 -5.2645 -13.2317 -14.1646 -0.0037
Th e demand for the diﬀ erent factors in the FTA scenario is also shown in Table 14. Demand for most 
of the factors of production grows in the primary sectors except for cotton sub-sector. Th e increased 
demand is consistent with the expansion of these sectors as the region specializes more on primary raw-
materials production. Th e manufacturing sectors in the FTA have mixed results for labour and capital 
demand. Demand for these factors in the low-tech industries contracts across board. A similar result 
occurs in the heavy industry sector. Th e agro-processing and clothing sectors would generally beneﬁ t in 
terms of increased labour and capital demand under the FTA. It is useful however to note that the more 
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important results relate to the returns that these factors have in each of the EPAs options. Th e returns 
to the factors of production in the SSA region comparing the scenarios for deeper regional integration 
without immediate reciprocity and the FTA are summarized in Table 15 below.
Table 15: Real returns to factors of production in SSA (percent deviation from base)
Deeper integration FTA
Land 1.3223 25.0395
Unskilled labour -0.3219 -1.9728
Skilled labour 0.7898 5.1056
Capital 0.8745 6.0111
Natural Resources -0.9176 -2.509
Integration in SSA, under the deepened intra-African integration, in addition to facilitating diversiﬁ cation 
in the industrial structure also results in positive returns to some of the crucial factors of production. 
Real returns to land, skilled labour and capital are positive, a result that is crucial in contributing to the 
region’s development. Similar outcomes but on a higher scale are also likely to be achieved in the case of 
a EU-SSA FTA form of EPA. However, due to its abundance and hence the rate of change in the money 
wage for unskilled labour in SSA, its real returns fall. Unlike the other factors of production whose supply 
is assumed ﬁ xed, unskilled labour is abundant in the SSA region and the fall in the real returns indicates 
that the nominal wage does not increase as fast as a result of this abundance. Th e returns to the factors 
of production and also the overall economic performance of the SSA region have implications for the 
regions welfare. Th is was evident at the aggregate level, where the SSA region was shown would lose 
in welfare terms from full reciprocity but gain from both the deepened integration and FTA scenario, 
with the latter according up to US$8 billion. Th e next sub-section decomposes the determinants of the 
welfare change under each of these scenarios, in order to highlight the potential implications each of the 
scenarios has in terms of policy.
Sources of welfare changes under EPAs options: decomposition
At the aggregate level, full-reciprocity on the EPAs indicated that apart from the European Union, all 
the other regions would experience welfare losses. Sub-Saharan Africa is likely to suﬀ er a welfare loss 
of US$564 million. Th e Table 16 shows the determinants of this welfare loss. Th e worsening terms-
of-trade that the SSA region will face explain more than half of the deterioration in the welfare. In 
other words, the inability of the exports to pay for the imports increase following the reciprocity will 
result in the African countries being worse-oﬀ  in an EPA with full reciprocity. Moreover, the region 
will also experience a welfare loss emanating from deterioration in the investment-savings balance. Th e 
only positive determinant of the welfare, though heavily out-weighed by the negatives, is the US$45.7 
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million resulting from the endowment changes36. Th is is attributable to net increase in demand for the 
unskilled labour.
Table 16: Sources of welfare changes by region (US$ million)
Efﬁ ciency Endowment 
Changes
Terms of 
Trade
Investment 
Savings balance
Total
EU15
Reciprocity 347.4 0 1412.8 -11.5 1748.8
Integration -34 0 -116.9 0.4 -150.5
FTA 628.9 0 503.9 -16.4 1116.3
CEEC
Reciprocity 5.4 0 -22.9 14.9 -2.5
Integration -1.4 0 -2.1 -1.8 -5.3
FTA 8.8 0 -124.9 -15.7 -131.8
NAM
Reciprocity -12 0 -91.3 20.2 -83.2
Integration -0.6 0 -46.4 -11.2 -58.2
FTA -24.9 0 -360.5 -53.5 -438.9
Japan
Reciprocity -19.2 0 -125.8 99.2 -45.8
Integration -6.3 0 -41 2.1 -45.2
FTA -55.5 0 -364.7 107.1 -313.1
SSA
Reciprocity -71.6 45.7 -323 -215.1 -563.9
Integration 168.6 844.7 174.4 16.7 1204.3
FTA 878.2 6112 1104.3 -65.8 8028.8
China
Reciprocity -16.1 0 -77.3 36.1 -57.3
Integration -2 0 -14.4 -0.1 -16.5
FTA -28.5 0 -149.2 33.5 -144.2
ROW
Reciprocity -201.7 0 -775 55.2 -921.5
Integration -12.8 0 46.1 -6.2 27.1
FTA -274.6 0 -620.1 11.1 -883.6
Th e intra-SSA trade barriers as they exist today impose a substantial cost to the region. Th eir elimination, 
in an EPA whose objectives is to create competitiveness through deepened regional integration would 
lead to the region reaping US$1,204 million in welfare gains. Th is gain would emanate mainly from the 
change in endowments utilization, better terms of trade in the region and removal of distortions that 
currently result in ineﬃ  cient allocation of the endowments under utilization. 
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But it is still an FTA that guarantees unrestricted market access into the EU that oﬀ ers the highest welfare 
gain of US$8,028.6 million for sub-Saharan African countries. And 75 percent of this improvement in 
welfare is attributable to increased demand in unskilled labour. Clearly, the EPAs if designed in favour 
of Africa have the long-term potential of addressing income poverty as indicated by the welfare gains 
emanating from endowment changes in the decomposition of the total welfare. Allocative eﬃ  ciency 
is also important, as there is potential from a reallocation of resources under an FTA with unrestricted 
market access to yield US$1,104.3 million in welfare.
Th e results that emerge from the welfare implications of the EPAs are consistent to the economic and trade 
eﬀ ects. Th at the EPAs should aim ﬁ rst to consolidate the intra-African trade. Th en secure unrestricted 
market access. Th e reciprocity elements of the EPAs should as much as possible be backloaded because of 
they will undermine the welfare gains through deterioration of terms of trade for SSA and also through 
weaker investment-savings balance for these countries.
Conclusion
An attempt has been made in this chapter to try and shed light on the possible impacts of the EPAs 
on African economies. Th e general equilibrium framework allowed the implications on the industrial 
structure to also be investigated. Th e main conclusions that can be drawn from the results and the 
discussion are that full reciprocity will be very costly for Africa irrespective of how the issue is looked at. 
A focus on deepening integration with a view to enhancing intra-African trade would provide positive 
results. But it is the scenario for unrestricted market access for Africa that portends the largest gain for the 
continent. Even with reciprocity, a free trade area that does not exclude sectors of export interest to Africa 
and one that deals with non-tariﬀ  barriers promises positive results for African countries. 
Th e overarching conclusion from these ﬁ ndings then are that sequencing of policy reforms that Africa 
will need to undertake is critical to the success of the EPAs. To begin with, the EPAs should focus on 
deepening intra-African trade. Th is should be given suﬃ  cient lead-time to allow the African countries 
build the requisite competitiveness. Th is would have to be accompanied with signiﬁ cant developmental 
programmes to complement the larger markets with increased supply and diversiﬁ ed capacities. Eventually, 
any tariﬀ  dismantlement by the African countries will need to be implemented in phases hand in hand 
with unrestricted market access for the African exports into the EU market. Clearly, the 10-12 years 
period interpreted from Article XXIV of GATT is only suﬃ  cient for the deepening of the intra-African 
trade. Th e EPAs should look beyond the 12 years as the possible dates for introducing reciprocity. Before 
then, unrestricted market access and deeper African integration will have provided suﬃ  cient room for 
supply capacities and exports diversity to be built in the continent.
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Potential Economic and Welfare Impacts of EPAs on African 
Countries: Partial Equilibrium Results
Introduction
In this chapter, the results using the WITS/SMART partial equilibrium model showing the possible 
impacts of the EU-SSA EPAs on individual countries participating in EPAs negotiations are 
discussed. Th e major weakness of the general equilibrium analysis, whose results were discussed in 
the previous chapter, was the limited number of African countries individually disaggregated in the 
GTAP database. Th is made it necessary for the partial equilibrium methodology to be considered, 
in spite of its weakness of ignoring sectoral and regional feedbacks when trade policy instruments 
are changed either in a given sector or all sectors in a given country.  However, given its capacity to 
allow analysis at high level of disaggregation, the partial equilibrium models become indispensable 
especially where there is interest in establishing sensitive sectors either with regards to industrial 
or ﬁ scal policies. In addition, most African countries report their trade data to the UN and WTO 
organisations, which are used in this partial equilibrium modelling, unlike the limited representation 
of individual countries in the GTAP database.
Essentially, the question the analysis in this chapter sought to answer is, what are the impacts on trade, 
revenue and welfare of eliminating tariﬀ  barriers that EU exports to African countries currently face? Or 
put diﬀ erently, what does it mean for a given African country to reciprocate on the trade preferences that 
it currently receives through EU’s trade preferences regime for ACP countries? 
In order to derive the results presented here, the benchmark for each country whose EPAs impact is 
analysed was the last year with available complete trade statistics on commodities ﬂ ows and applied 
tariﬀ s. For all the countries reported, the benchmark dates fall between 2001-2003, which is a reasonably 
recent period to base the analysis. Th e results are organized following the EPAs negotiations groupings 
in the continent: ESA; CEMAC; ECOWAS; and SADC. In each of these regional groupings negotiating 
an EPA with the EU, the results on trade creation and diversion, revenue and welfare implications are 
reported. In the case of trade, some further elaborations is available at the country level to show the 
impacts total elimination of tariﬀ s on EU sourced imports.
Th e simulation scenario
Unlike the general equilibrium analysis where it was possible to look at several scenarios, only one 
simulation was undertaken for each country with the partial model. Th is scenario looks only at the 
reciprocity principal. Due to the weaknesses already pointed out especially the ceteris paribus assumption 
upon which this model operates; only one-way liberalization is possible. Th e results discussed here are 
the possible outcomes of reducing to zero the import duties that the SSA countries impose on EU goods. 
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One special advantage of the WITS/SMART model is that it allowed the analysis to be undertaken at the 
6-digit level. Th ere was therefore no aggregation problem such as the one with the GTAP database.  
Th e trade created from the full reciprocity scenario depends on the following three key elements as discussed 
in the analytical methodology: the initial level of trade (imports from the EU by individual countries), 
the initial level of protection and the price elasticity of import demand. Th e higher the initial level of 
protection, the greater would be the change expected from the reciprocation policy. Th e transmission 
mechanism for the trade eﬀ ects is simple: the elimination of existing tariﬀ s on EU imports reduces the 
prices that consumers in the importing African country face compared to domestic substitutes and the 
responsiveness of demand to the price change inﬂ uences the amount of trade created or diverted. Th e 
substitutability of the EU goods for domestic goods is implicitly assumed. Th e Armington assumption 
at HS 6-digit level is that goods imported from diﬀ erent countries are imperfect substitutes. It is also 
assumed that the supply response to the price reduction will allow the EU producers and exporters to 
meet any demand arising in the importing countries as a result of price reduction. Th at is, export supplies 
are perfectly elastic which means that world supplies of each variety of the goods by origin are given.
Th e EU-ESA Economic Partnership Agreement: Trade creation and diversion eﬀ ects
Th e partial equilibrium eﬀ ects of reciprocal trade preferences between EU and ESA countries are shown 
clearly in Table 17. Th e results presented on the trade eﬀ ects indicate that in all the countries, as expected, 
signiﬁ cant trade creation will occur for the EU goods. Overall, the EPAs reciprocity principal, with all 
things being equal, will lead to expansion of trade. In no country does the trade diversion exceed trade 
creation, meaning that there will be positive trade eﬀ ect in each of the countries as a result of the EPAs. 
Th e trade creation indicated in the table is in favour of the expanded EU exports into the respective 
countries within ESA. Th e created trade in the classical sense imply supplanting of domestic production 
in the ESA countries. 
Trade diversions indicated on the other hand signify the level of trade that is shifted from the rest of the 
world including other ESA countries to the EU producers. Given similar conditions, the rest of the world 
would more eﬃ  ciently produce the diverted trade, but because of the tariﬀ  reductions on EU imports, 
the more ineﬃ  cient EU producers are favoured over the more eﬃ  cient rest of the world producers. 
Th e results presented in Table 17 can be interpreted as follows. Take the case of Burundi. If Burundi were 
to dismantle the tariﬀ s it imposes on the goods from the 25 member-countries of the enlarged EU, trade 
worth US$12.4 million would be created in favour of the EU. Th is additional trade would be of beneﬁ t 
to the Burundi consumers in the sense that more eﬃ  cient EU producers and exporters will supplant 
ineﬃ  cient producers in Burundi. While this created trade is considered to be welfare enhancing since it 
expands the consumer surplus, the tariﬀ  dismantlement will also lead to a net trade diversion of US$1.6 
million. Th e EU captures this diverted trade; hence the overall EU’s trade gain of US$13.9 million. Of 
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the US$1.6 million worth of diverted trade, 17 percent is trade that before the tariﬀ  dismantlement 
originated from the COMESA region, the REC in which Burundi is a member. Th e tariﬀ  dismantlement 
by Burundi, while it appears to be trade expanding overall, has two potential negative implications. First, 
the overall diverted trade will be welfare decreasing as it was originally from more eﬃ  cient non-EU rest 
of the world. And secondly, there is signiﬁ cant loss within the regional economic community.
Looking closely at Table 17, most of the trade creation in ESA in favour of the EU will under a EU-ESA 
EPA take place in Kenya, Mauritius, Sudan and Ethiopia. In the case of Kenya and Mauritius, a mixture 
of the signiﬁ cance of the tariﬀ s reduced and the large volume of trade in these two countries drive the 
large impact. Ethiopia’s large eﬀ ects are more to do with the initial level of protection which if eliminated 
will create substantial room for EU sourced imports. It is therefore clear, ignoring the general equilibrium 
eﬀ ects, that the EPAs will be trade expanding but at a cost to regional integration. 
Table 17: Trade Creation and Diversion Eﬀ ects of EPAs for ESA Countries (US$)
Country Trade creation Net trade diversion ESA’s diverted trade EU’s trade gain
Burundi 12,352,687.00 -1,590,623.00 -269,314.00 13,943,310.00
DRC 45,389,815.00 -6,839,450.00 -134,193.00 52,229,265.00
Ethiopia 120,678,556.00 -31,151,559.00 -3,285,650.00 151,830,115.00
Eritrea 13,137,093.00 -1,381,481.00 -26,814.00 14,518,574.00
Djibouti 56,456,321.00 -9,564,476.00 -215,526.00 66,020,797.00
Kenya 211,271,997.00 -60,498,415.00 -2,426,328.00 271,770,412.00
Madagascar 16,555,404.00 -4,086,557.00 -248,092.00 20,641,961.00
Malawi 15,124,010.00 -6,545,835.00 -331,744.00 21,669,845.00
Mauritius 166,926,856.00 -44,739,919.00 -2,864,042.00 211,666,775.00
Rwanda 10,552,742.00 -3,056,649.00 -749,240.00 13,609,391.00
Seychelles 25,349,172.00 -2,726,566.00 -371,749.00 28,075,738.00
Zimbabwe 45,604,361.00 -17,633,252.00 -253,778.00 63,237,613.00
Sudan 119,558,097.00 -33,493,487.00 -1,232,861.00 153,051,584.00
Uganda 19,166,664.00 -9,017,648.00 -1,236,647.00 28,184,312.00
Zambia 31,748,630.00 -10,358,152.00 -433,072.00 42,106,782.00
Source: WITS/SMART Simulations
Figure 6 indicates the growth in imports by source (exports to ESA destination) following tariﬀ 
dismantlement in favour of EU imports into ESA countries. Clearly, producers in ESA countries will face 
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serious competition from EU producers. In particular, Mauritius, Djibouti, Seychelles, and Zimbabwe 
will become signiﬁ cant markets for EU products.
Figure 6: Export eﬀ ect of EPAs for ESA Countries
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Revenue implications
Th e majority of ESA countries have substantial reliance on import duties as a source of government 
revenues. Th is reliance on trade taxes might at times be a serious binding constraint to development 
activities in situations where the concentration of the source of these revenues is in a few countries’ 
imports. Th e EU serves as a signiﬁ cant source for most of the ESA countries’ imports and is therefore a 
major component of the import taxes base. Th e elimination of the import tariﬀ s on EU-sourced imports 
is therefore an important factor in the economic analysis of EPAs. Table 18 indicates the likely losses in 
revenues for each of the ESA member country due to the reciprocal treatment of EU goods into the ESA 
countries’ markets. Th e results indicate the value of tax revenues the ESA countries are likely to forego 
under the reciprocal arrangement for trade policy between the EU and ESA nations.
Table 18: Revenue implications of a EU-ESA EPA (US$)
Country Revenue shortfall
Burundi -7,664,911.00
DRC -24,691,828.00
Ethiopia -55,126,359.00
Eritrea -7,385,208.00
Djibouti -37,523,124.00
Kenya -107,281,328.00
Madagascar -7,711,790.00
Malawi -7,090,310.00
Mauritius -71,117,968.00
Rwanda -5,622,946.00
Seychelles -24,897,374.00
Zimbabwe -18,430,590.00
Sudan -73,197,468.00
Uganda -9,458,170.00
Zambia -15,844,184.00
Source: WITS/SMART Simulations
In absolute value terms, the countries that will suﬀ er most from the elimination of the tariﬀ s on EU goods 
are Kenya, Sudan, Mauritius, Ethiopia, DRC and Seychelles. Th e foregone revenue in itself presents a 
major challenge to these countries ability to reciprocate on the trade preferences obtained from the EU. 
In a number of these countries, the reliance on trade taxes is dictated both by the simplicity of their 
administration and also their use as part of industrial policy. In terms of their use due to ease of collection, 
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most of the countries are likely to ﬁ nd it diﬃ  cult even in the short-term to come up with ways to replace 
the foregone revenues. Th is is likely to be made more diﬃ  cult by the low productivity (both in terms of 
elasticity and buoyancy) of the alternative taxes to the import duties. Th e speed within which tax policy 
and administration changes can be eﬀ ected to raise productivity of the other taxes to ﬁ ll the shortfall from 
import taxes becomes a major determinant of the practicability of the reciprocal principle of the EPAs. 
Th e adjustment costs of undertaking tax policy and administration reforms are likely to weigh heavily on 
the ESA economies. Th is is because the nature of these adjustment costs is such that they are not only 
ﬁ nancial, but involve also human resources. Administration of income taxes and consumption taxes such 
as the VAT are more human capital demanding than the administration of import duties.
Moreover, the EPAs generated revenue shortfalls will also have economic, social and political dimensions. 
Th e fact that these countries will need to resort to income and consumption taxes will introduce growth 
and equity issues. Policy makers will be faced with the unwelcome option of having to rely on income 
taxes, which tend to have a more deﬁ ned negative relationship with economic growth. And on the aspect 
of equity, consumption taxes are likely to be more regressive. 
Welfare implications of the EU-ESA EPA
Welfare enhancing properties of trade liberalization have always made it an attractive policy. Nonetheless, 
measuring the welfare accruing to a country as a result of trade liberalization has not been simple. 
Empirical investigation of this question due to measurement problems has therefore not been an easy 
matter. Welfare changes arising from tariﬀ  changes have been analysed within the context of consumer 
and producer surpluses. In addition, implicit welfare changes derived from government revenues arising 
from tariﬀ s alterations can also be considered on top of the consumer and producer surpluses. 
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Table 19: Welfare (consumer surplus) implications of a EU-ESA EPA (US$)
Country Consumer surplus
Burundi 1,825,590.00
DRC 3,832,716.00
Ethiopia 19,029,481.00
Eritrea 1,157,124.00
Djibouti 10,894,790.00
Kenya 30,657,688.00
Madagascar 863,988.00
Malawi 2,105,759.00
Mauritius 57,580,281.00
Rwanda 875,792.00
Seychelles 8,067,172.00
Zimbabwe 8,190,357.00
Sudan 19,157,950.00
Uganda 1,661,690.00
Zambia 3,389,191.00
Source: WITS/SMART Simulations
Th e WITS/SMART model applied to measure welfare implications of the reciprocal principle of the 
EPAs underestimates the total welfare change in that it quantiﬁ es only the consumer surplus change but 
ignores the producer surplus movements. Th us, the results reported in Table 19 are for the consumer 
surplus changes due to the EPAs reciprocity. Th e results indicate that in addition to the trade creation 
noted previously, all the ESA countries stand to gain in terms of consumer welfare. 
Th e level of welfare gain depends to a large extent on the level of trade creation. It is therefore not 
surprising that it is in countries such as Mauritius and Kenya that also witness substantial trade creation 
whose consumers seem to beneﬁ t signiﬁ cantly from the EPAs reciprocation. Weighed against the revenue 
loss, the trade expansion eﬀ ect and positive welfare changes present the EPAs as potentially beneﬁ cial 
arrangements for ESA countries. However, these are static results and the welfare results do not account 
for the producer surplus loss that occurs due to the supplanting of domestic producers in the ESA 
countries by the EU producers. Moreover, the partial analysis ignores the changes in the economic 
structure, which in a dynamic sense are likely to have tampering eﬀ ects on the potential gains indicated 
from the partial analysis.
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Th e EU-ECOWAS Economic Partnership Agreement: Trade creation and 
diversion eﬀ ects
Th e ECOWAS region, like the ESA countries, similarly stands to experience rapid trade creation eﬀ ects 
for EU producers and exporters as reﬂ ected in the Table 20. In particular, the EU is going to beneﬁ t by 
having strong growth of its exports into countries such as Nigeria, Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire and Senegal. 
EU exports into Ghana for instance will grow by 37.5 percent over the base. Indeed, apart from Guinea-
Bissau where EU exports grow by 15.5 percent, in all the other countries, the average growth is above 20 
percent (see Figure 7 overleaf ).
Table 20: Trade Creation and Diversion Eﬀ ects of EPAs for ECOWAS Countries (US$)
Country Trade Creation Net Trade 
Diversion
ECOWAS 
Diverted Trade
EU’s Trade
Gain
Ghana 267,762,342.00 -101,924,746.00 -23,480,674.00 369,687,088.00
Burkina Faso 40,483,269.50 -9,180,224.00 -2,883,310.00 49,663,493.50
Bénin 61,057,168.50 -14,118,814.00 -2,695,298.00 75,175,982.50
Cote d’Ivoire 188,827,587.50 -26,441,888.00 -1,771,993.00 215,269,475.50
Guinée-Bissau 2,847,097.50 -272,652.00 0.00 3,119,749.50
Senegal 144,594,478.50 -16,273,266.00 0.00 160,867,744.50
Niger 39,532,750.00 -4,265,105.00 0.00 43,797,855.00
Nigeria 617,735,025.00 -172,854,272.00 -4,174.34 790,589,297.00
Mauritanie 28,506,803.00 -5,301,686.00 -248,052.00 33,808,489.00
Mali 54,709,194.50 -4,454,198.00 0.00 59,163,392.50
Togo 58,332,504.50 -6,494,013.00 0.00 64,826,517.50
Source: WITS/SMART Simulations
Similarly to the trade diversion eﬀ ects in ESA, in the ECOWAS region, substantial trade will be diverted in 
Ghana and also in Nigeria. In the Nigerian case, as much as US$173 million of trade value will be diverted 
to EU from possibly more eﬃ  cient producers in the rest of the world. However, unlike in the ESA grouping 
where all the countries experience trade diversion from the rest of the REC partners, ﬁ ve of the countries in 
ECOWAS register no trade diversion from the rest of the REC members. Th is indicates the limited eﬃ  cient 
intra-ECOWAS trade for these countries that include Togo, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Guinea-Bissau. Also 
noteworthy is the limited trade diversion occurring in Nigerian from the ECOWAS member countries. 
In the case of Ghana, 23 percent of the trade diverted is originally from ECOWAS member countries. 
Burkina-Faso, Benin and Cote-d’Ivoire will also express substantial trade diversion of ECOWAS origin. 
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Th e intra-ECOWAS trade, which before the EPAs is limited to only a few countries, is likely to be 
undermined further through the reciprocity principle of the EPAs. Th is limited intra-ECOWAS trade 
will therefore experience negative shock from the EPA reciprocation as the ECOWAS producers exporting 
within the region are likely to face it increasingly diﬃ  cult to compete with the EU-sourced goods as can 
be deduced from Figure 7. 
Figure 7: Export eﬀ ect of EPAs for ECOWAS Countries
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Th erefore, the two principles of reciprocity and deeper regional integration are likely to pull in diﬀ erent 
direction. Th e ECOWAS producers and exporters to member countries are likely to be supplanted by 
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the EU producers as evidenced by the reduction of exports from the rest of ECOWAS to countries such 
as Ghana and Mauritania. Th e case for emphasising on the principle of diﬀ erentiation with respect to 
sectors that can be opened up for competition with the EU is underlined by this possibility of reciprocity 
and deeper regional integration working at cross-purposes. In other countries in ECOWAS where there 
are insigniﬁ cant imports from the rest of ECOWAS as is the case for Guinea Bissau, Senegal, Niger, 
Mali, and Togo, the possibility of such trade emerging is likely to be curtailed by imports from the 
EU. Given that the principles of reciprocity, deeper regional integration and diﬀ erentiation are likely to 
have diﬀ erent weights from individual or group of countries perspective and even globally, the negative 
impacts of the EPAs to regional trade cannot be ignored.
Revenue implications
As would be expected, the elimination of tariﬀ s for EU-sourced imports in ECOWAS countries would 
harm the government revenue positions in these countries. Th e extent of revenue shortfall as a result 
of the import duties foregone on EU exports into the region varies across the countries as indicated 
in Table 21. But, it is in the large economies and also most open economies that the revenue crunch 
is most experienced. Nigeria will have to forego up to US$427 million. Ghana also will be adversely 
aﬀ ected in terms of revenue collections, as its revenues based on the EU-imports base will go down by 
US$194 million. In a few of the countries, the revenue foregone is not signiﬁ cant in value terms. Th is is 
particularly the case for Guinea-Bissau that is estimated will forego only about US$2 million. Probably 
at this point, another weakness of the WITS/SMART approach to measuring revenue shortfalls needs 
highlighting. Th e revenue loss indicated in the Table 21 relates to imports tariﬀ  revenues. In reality, the 
increased imports presented earlier resulting from trade creation are in most countries subject to indirect 
taxes such as the VAT. As such, as long as there is rapid increase in the volume and value of imports into 
the ECOWAS countries, and these countries have indirect taxes such as VAT for whom imports form 
part of the base, then the revenue shortfall shown in Table 21 will be tampered oﬀ . However, unless the 
elasticity of the VAT and indirect taxes is signiﬁ cantly higher than that for import duties, it is unlikely 
that the addition indirect taxes revenues will outweigh the revenue foregone from the import tariﬀ s.
Nevertheless, in terms of evaluating the EPAs for ECOWAS countries at least, it can be noted that the 
revenue foregone is likely to have negative impacts on other government programmes. When this is 
combined with the feature of the reciprocal principle of undermining regional integration, one is left 
with a picture that goes beyond the normal international trade theory arguments. Th e question about the 
signiﬁ cance of non-economic reasons for integration comes into play, while at the same time; the cost of 
the EPAs is magniﬁ ed through the revenue losses.
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Table 21: Revenue implications of a EU-ECOWAS EPA (US$)
Country Revenue Shortfall
Ghana -193,683,365.00
Burkina Faso -22,003,937.50
Benin -39,523,104.00
Cote d’Ivoire -112,236,538.00
Guinée-Bissau -1,990,216.50
Senegal -80,203,188.50
Niger -20,487,214.00
Nigeria -426,902,557.50
Mauritanie -14,572,779.00
Mali -33,141,747.00
Togo -35,471,728.00
Source: WITS/SMART Simulations
Welfare implications
Th e welfare implications of the EU-ECOWAS Economic Partnership Agreement as measured by the 
changes in the consumer surplus are indicated in the Table 22.  Th e consumers in the ECOWAS countries 
will derive signiﬁ cant gains from the EPAs in that they will have access to goods at lower prices. To this 
point, it is assumed that the EU producers and exporters will not be pricing to market. In other words, 
there is an implicit assumption that the EU exporters will pass on the beneﬁ ts of the tariﬀ s reduction to 
the ECOWAS consumers. If the beneﬁ ts for tariﬀ  dismantlement are not passed on to the ECOWAS 
consumers, it is possible that there will be no increase in consumer welfare. While the rate of decline of 
the prices of EU exports to ECOWAS remain unclear, in this exposition and in the results discussed for 
this region and other RECs, it is assumed that prices fall concomitantly to the tariﬀ  rates easing, resulting 
in consumer beneﬁ t for the trade creation. 
Th e same caveat highlighted under ESA, also applies in the measurement of the welfare eﬀ ects of the 
ECOWAS EPA. Th e overall economic welfare eﬀ ects are not clear within a partial equilibrium modelling 
framework since producer surplus changes especially due to supplanting of domestic producers by the 
EU producers has not been captured in this analysis. Nonetheless, the big economies of ECOWAS that 
is, Nigeria and Ghana experience substantial consumer surplus gains. Besides, Senegal and Cote d’Ivoire 
are also likely to obtain some signiﬁ cant improvement in their welfare.
74
While recognising the weakness of the consumer surplus as a proxy for welfare implications of the EPAs, 
the partial equilibrium results tell only part of the story. Indeed, increased imports through trade creation 
do not only beneﬁ t consumers in the ECOWAS region. In addition to this are potential gains likely to 
emanate from embodied technologies in some of the imports, that might eventually be welfare enhancing. 
Th is will however depend on whether capital equipments and machineries and such imports that tend to 
have embodied technologies are already zero-rated as tends to be the case in most countries or not. 
Table 22: Welfare (consumer surplus) implications of a EU-ECOWAS EPA (US$)
Country Consumer Surplus
Ghana 71,478,699.50
Burkina Faso 3,834,553.00
Bénin 6,595,922.00
Cote d’Ivoire 16,206,072.00
Guinea-Bissau 221,876.00
Senegal 12,470,439.50
Niger 3,904,466.00
Nigeria 113,346,061.50
Mauritanie 2,471,498.50
Mali 4,482,770.00
Togo 5,462,732.50
Source: WITS/SMART Simulations
Like in the case of trade eﬀ ects (creation and diversion), the outcomes through EPAs reciprocity will 
depend on the initial conditions. Th erefore, for countries like Burkina Faso and Mauritania, which 
have been fast trade liberalizers, the welfare implications might seem small because the required changes 
in the reciprocation to the EU preferences are not major. Ultimately though, all the ECOWAS region 
countries are likely to experience positive consumer welfare and whether the net welfare gain will remain 
positive, depends on whether the supplanted producers in the region experience outweighing producer 
surplus losses.
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Th e EU-CEMAC/ECCAS Economic Partnership Agreement: Trade creation and 
diversion eﬀ ects
Th e Central African countries like other regions in Africa will experience substantial trade expansion if there 
was going to be reciprocal treatment under the EPAs for the EU goods. Once again, while there is some trade 
diversion that occurs in a EU-CEMAC/ECCAS EPA, the trade creation far exceeds the diversion, resulting in 
positive trade expansion in each of the countries as indicated in Table 23. Th e EU will therefore have a rapid 
expansion of its market. In value terms, the most signiﬁ cant expansion will occur in Cameroon, Congo Republic 
and Gabon. As in other African regions negotiating as a group with the EU due to their belonging in same REC, 
the reciprocal treatment will most likely undermine the objective (principle) of deeper regional integration.
Trade diversion from the rest of the world is signiﬁ cant in some of the CEMAC countries. Th is is more 
so the case in Gabon where 22 percent of the total trade gain for the EU is comprised of trade diverted 
from the non-EU countries. And more signiﬁ cantly, for Gabon, ﬁ ve percent of this trade is from other 
CEMAC countries. Congo Republic and Cameroon also register substantial trade diversion. In the case 
of Congo Republic, this is equivalent to 16.6 percent of EU’s trade gain. Close to 10 percent of EU’s 
trade gain in Cameroon is as result of trade diversion.
Table 23: Trade Creation and Diversion Eﬀ ects of EPAs for CEMAC Countries (US$)
Country Trade Creation Net Trade 
Diversion
CEMAC’s Diverted 
Trade
EU’s Trade Gain
Cameroon 255,425,935.00 -26,568,238.00 0.00 281,994,173.00
Congo Republic 123,707,240.00 -20,477,850.00 0.00 144,185,090.00
Gabon 126,494,870.00 -27,689,910.00 -1,244,920.00 154,184,780.00
Equatorial Guinea 53,293,680.00 -5,389,737.00 0.00 58,683,417.00
Central African Rep. 8,232,940.00 -1,252,818.00 -305,600.00 9,485,758.00
Chad 40,732,150.00 -5,941,230.00 0.00 46,673,380.00
As seen in Figure 8, there is very little intra-CEMAC/ECCAS trade. It is only in the Central African 
Republic and Gabon where the reciprocal treatment of EU imports in the CEMAC countries has trade 
diversion away from other CEMAC countries. In countries like Chad, Equatorial-Guinea, Congo 
Republic and Cameroon, there is surprisingly insigniﬁ cant level of trade with other CEMAC/ECCAS 
countries. Th is situation is going to be made worse by the rapid expansion of EU exports into these 
countries. In all the CEMAC countries, EU exports will expand by at least 25 percent from the base year. 
Th e development and deepening of intra-CEMAC/ECCAS trade will therefore be undermined by the 
reciprocal treatment of EU-sourced imports.
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Figure 8: Imports in CEMAC countries by origin as a result of EPAs
Origin of Central African Countries imports in an EU-CEMAC/ECCAS EPAS
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Consistent to the results for ESA and ECOWAS, the EPAs, on the basis of the trade creation eﬀ ects 
appear will be most beneﬁ cial to the EU unless there are other elements favourable to the CEMAC 
countries. Th e fact that intra-CEMAC trade might be undermined makes it even more important for 
mechanisms that ensure maximisation of gains for individual and group of countries to be prioritised. 
Th e Central African region is one of the least integrated parts of Africa, meaning that the principle of 
deeper integration should be emphasised in the EPAs negotiations for this region vis-à-vis the reciprocity 
principle. Moreover, adjustment to the reciprocal principle will not be easy as the region’s governments; 
will be faced with declining revenues (see Table 24). 
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Table 24: Revenue implications of a EU-CEMAC EPA (US$)
Country Revenue Shortfall
Cameroon -149,256,117.00
Congo Republic -75,104,052.00
Gabon -74,302,297.00
Equatorial Guinea -33,914,150.00
Central African Republic -5,844,950.00
Chad -26,677,028.00
Source: ECA, WITS/SMART Simulations
Cameroon, Congo Republic, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Chad will have signiﬁ cant absolute reductions 
in their revenues. Since the replacement of the revenue foregone cannot be achieved instantaneously, then 
concrete measures that would ensure ﬁ scal sustainability once the EPAs are launched become critical. 
Otherwise, the revenue shortfall, coupled with trade creation that favours the EU, and the ability of the 
EPAs to undermine the regional integration eﬀ orts through deeper intra-regional trade, mean that the 
CEMAC countries are more likely to be net losers. Th e welfare gain shown in Table 25 and captured 
through the consumer surplus due to removal of trade restrictions on the EU goods may not be suﬃ  cient 
to counter the apparent imbalance in favour of the EU.
Table 25: Welfare (consumer surplus) implications of a EU-CEMAC/ECCAS EPA (US$)
Country Consumer Surplus
Cameroon 30,260,214.00
Congo Republic 16,047,979.00
Gabon 16,116,391.00
Equatorial Guinea 6,231,219.00
Central African Republic 1,050,210.00
Chad 4,348,180.00
Source: ECA, WITS/SMART Simulations
Th e consumers in the Central African regions, as expected, stand to beneﬁ t from the EPAs reciprocity 
principle. However, this welfare measure ignores the reduced producer surplus due to the supplanting of 
domestic producers in each of the countries within the region by the EU producers as evidenced by the 
rapid expansion of the EU exports.
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Th e EU-SADC Economic Partnership Agreement: Trade creation and diversion eﬀ ects
SADC is spearheading negotiations with the EU on behalf of seven of its member countries. Four of 
these countries, that is, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS) are also part of the South 
African Customs Union (SACU) jointly with the Republic of South Africa. However, in terms of EPAs 
negotiations, South Africa is not eligible. In any case, South Africa already has a Technical Cooperation 
and Development Agreement (TDCA) with the EU. However, an EPA that includes the BLNS countries 
is likely to be impinged upon by rules, which are dictated by the RSA-EU Technical Cooperation and 
Development Agreement of 2000.
For the seven countries whose EPAs negotiations are being spearheaded by SADC, the trade creation and 
diversion eﬀ ects are presented in the Table 26. In the three countries, the net trade eﬀ ect will be trade 
expansion, with all the expansion being attributed to increased market share for the EU. In Angola for 
example, the net trade eﬀ ect will be an expansion of US$213.5 million. Of the total EU’s trade gain in 
Angola, 18 percent will be composed of diverted trade from other countries that arguably are possibly 
more eﬃ  cient. Tanzania will also provide signiﬁ cant scope for market expansion for the EU, with the 
potential of total trade growth equivalent to US$88.6 million. Th irty percent of this trade will be diverted 
trade. Th e Mozambique trade eﬀ ects appear small in absolute terms compared to the other two countries 
outside SACU. Th e reason for this subdued response is not so much because of the small size of the 
Mozambican economy, but also because Mozambique has been one of the fastest liberalizers in Africa. 
Meaning that its tariﬀ s were already low by the time of implementing the EPA reciprocity experiment.
Table 26: Trade Creation and Diversion Eﬀ ects of EPAs for Selected SADC Countries (US$)
Trade Creation Net Trade Diversion SADC Diverted  Trade EU’s Trade Gain
Angola 174,486,238.00 -39,002,117.00 -95,439.00 213,488,355.00
Botswana 9,319,349.00 -4,078,001.00 -5,940.00 13,397,350.00
Lesotho 486,569.00 -30,002.00 -105.00 516,571.00
Mozambique 16,487,354.00 -5,868,765.00 0.00 22,356,119.00
Namibia 6,992,788.00 -3,792,184.00 -13,123.00 10,784,972.00
Swaziland 979,162.00 -505,980.00 -1,003.00 1,485,142.00
Tanzania 63,523,552.00 -25,090,704.00 -607,417.00 88,614,256.00
Source: ECA, WITS/SMART Simulations
In the case of the SACU countries except South Africa, there will also be positive trade growth. Given the 
existence of a common external tariﬀ  within SACU countries, it is reasonable to treat the four countries 
as one market, the BLNS market. Consequently, a SADC-EU EPA is likely to result in a trade creation 
79
equivalent to US$17.8 million. Th e deep integration of the SACU countries is evident from the limited 
trade diversion taking place in these countries markets. Th is contrasts sharply to the more than 32 percent 
of EU’s trade gain in the BLNS countries that emanates from trade diversion from the rest of the world. 
As would be expected, the EU exports into the SADC countries indicate a signiﬁ cant level of growth 
reaching at least 30 percent in Tanzania and Swaziland. In Mozambique, the EU exports expand by an 
additional 20 percent. Th e trade diversion indicated in Table 26 can also be visually seen in Figure 9. 
As indicated above, this diversion occurs both for other SADC member countries exporting into other 
member countries and also for the rest of the world countries. In the case of Tanzania, imports from the 
rest of the world are likely to contract by as much as 20 percent, with most of this trade being taken 
over by the EU. Tanzania and Angola also experience reduced imports from the rest of SADC countries, 
indicating possible negative impact of EPAs reciprocity to the objective of deepening regional integration 
through trade. 
Figure 9: Implications on exports into SADC countries of an EPA by origin
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As Figure 9 indicates, and also considering similar trend in the partial equilibrium results of the other 
African EPAs, there is need for the diﬀ erentiation principle enshrined in the Cotonou Partnership 
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Agreement to be considered in the light of how it can be used to deepen regional trade, without 
compromising the desire for eﬃ  ciency represented by the overall trade expansion in the EPA. Clearly, a 
consistent story has emerged that while globally the trade creation exceed trade diversion, at the country 
and regional level, the EPAs outcome is likely to be one that negates the objective of having greater 
integration among African countries. Th is implies, in the case the SADC-coordinated EPA, and also for 
the others, there is a trade-oﬀ  between the reciprocity and the deeper regional integration principles of 
the EPAs. However, it is clear that in the case of SADC, the deep integration that has already taken place 
through SACU will minimize the negative eﬀ ects that are associated with trade diversion. Trade diversion 
will be limited in the BLNS countries.
Revenue implications of a SADC-EU EPA
Th e revenue implications for SADC countries are likely to be a more serious issue for those members 
outside SACU. Th is is because, within SACU, there is a tariﬀ  revenue sharing formula that may not be 
adversely aﬀ ected much by the EPAs impact. In any case, as Table 27 shows, the revenue eﬀ ects are only 
signiﬁ cant for Botswana at US$5.2 million and Namibia at US$3.8 million. For the other two BLNS 
countries, namely Lesotho and Swaziland, the revenue shortfalls are not substantial even though these 
are small economies also.
Table 27: Revenue impacts of a possible SADC-EU EPA (US$)
Country Revenue Shortfall
Angola -103,254,613.00
Botswana -5,232,995.00
Lesotho -256,314.00
Mozambique -7,640,140.00
Namibia -3,831,993.00
Swaziland -811,140.00
Tanzania -32,490,659.00
In the case of the non-SACU countries, Angola in absolute terms stands to lose US$103.2 million. 
Tanzania may also lose up to US$32.5 million from the dismantlement of the tariﬀ s currently levied on 
EU goods. Mozambique, which is the smallest economy of the three non-SACU countries, is likely to 
experience a shortfall of US$7.6 million. As in the case of the other potential EPAs discussed so far, there 
are costs associated to the revenue shortfall. In particular, challenges associated to policy reforms will have 
to be dealt with. In the case of Angola, there is the added challenge that a signiﬁ cant part of its revenues is 
based on natural resources extraction. Th is means that the tax administration infrastructure to cope with 
income or indirect taxes taxation is not as developed as in other economies in the region. Mozambique 
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also will face the challenge of having to deepen its reforms further, even though it has been undertaking 
economic reforms at an accelerated pace for a post-conﬂ ict country.
Welfare implications of a SADC-EU EPA
Unlike in the potential EPAs for ESA, ECOWAS and CEMAC, the SADC region gains in terms of 
consumer welfare are much lower in value terms. Th ese consumer welfare eﬀ ects are directly related to 
the trade creation resulting from the tariﬀ s dismantlement. In the BLNS countries, there is a likelihood 
of non-substantial trade creation and consequently, the resulting welfare eﬀ ects appear smaller. For the 
four countries that are members of SACU, the estimated welfare gains on the basis of 2001 trade statistics 
is only US$757,935. Th is somehow emphasises the negative impacts such as revenue shortfall and trade 
diversion that the EPAs appear to be portending for these countries.
As for the non-SACU countries, Angola will beneﬁ t by close to US$15 million improvement in welfare. 
Although this is insigniﬁ cant compared to the large revenue losses, which implicitly relate to Angola’s 
social welfare. Tanzania can hope to gain in terms of consumer welfare, US$8.2 million. 
Table 28: Welfare implications of a SADC-EU EPA (US$)
Country Consumer Surplus
Angola 14,940,260.00
Botswana 365,737.00
Lesotho 68,492.00
Mozambique 1,698,084.00
Namibia 246,540.00
Swaziland 77,166.00
Tanzania 8,180,419.00
Source: ECA, WITS/SMART Simulations
Conclusion
Th is chapter has presented overall results using a partial equilibrium model of the likely impacts of the EPAs 
being negotiated between four African regions and the EU. Th e discussion has focused on the impacts 
of a full tariﬀ  dismantlement in favour of EU exports to Africa on respective countries. Th e consistent 
outcome in each of the proposed EPA is that EU stands to gain signiﬁ cantly in terms of expanded trade 
into these markets. While part of this trade expansion will result from trade creation, which is welfare 
improving, signiﬁ cant proportions of the trade gain will also be due to trade diversion from the rest of 
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the world and from within the EPA grouping itself. As a result, while the reciprocity principle appears to 
be trade expanding, it will pose serious implications for deepened regional integration in Africa. Indeed, 
unless there are clear mitigating measures, the EPAs could seriously undermine the gains that have been 
achieved so far in the integration process of the continent. 
Another consistent result from the simulations, are the potential adjustment costs that African countries 
will have to bear as a result of revenue shortfalls. Given the prominence of  EU imports into these countries, 
the reliance of majority of the African countries on tariﬀ  revenues, the tariﬀ  dismantlement result in all 
cases in signiﬁ cant revenue shortfalls. It is only in the SACU countries where tariﬀ  losses appear limited 
and even then the revenues sharing formula within SACU is likely to ameliorate any shocks from the 
EPAs in those countries. Th e major challenge that these revenue shortfalls will pose is the adjustment 
costs associated with tax policy and administration reforms. Th e EPAs, if no appropriate measures are put 
in place to forestall the macroeconomic imbalances that are likely to result from the falling revenues, will 
have the possibility of undermining developmental objectives of the African countries.
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Endnotes
1 It is important to note that when free trade of goods and services eventually becomes a reality, the non-
LDCs may be at a stronger position than the LDCs that remain simply under EBA, as the non-LDCs will 
have been forced to restructure more deeply under EPAs. It is reasonable therefore to assume that EPAs 
may have more positive eﬀ ects when compared to EBA initiative with respect to encouraging continuous 
structural adjustments that enable producers to restructure and hence be more competitive in the various 
economies that form EPAs.
2 Whether an LDC country chooses EBA over EPA, it will still be faced with supply-side constraints. 
Th ese will even be more pronounced by the fact that whether under EPA or EBA, preference erosion will 
be a reality when the Doha Round is concluded. Th erefore, in order to resolve the supply-side constraints, 
adjustment will be required in the respective economies. Such adjustment is likely to be delayed under 
EBA when compared to the EPAs. Th e important issue then is to note that long-term competitiveness of 
economies under EBA may be delayed compared to those under EPA. 
3 Th e Cotonou Partnership Agreement aims at reciprocity in trade policy for the EU and the ACP 
countries. Hence, the EPAs are expected to aim at the ﬁ nal products being FTAs. However, the European 
Union recently oﬀ ered (see EC letter by Pascal Lamy and Franz Fischer dated 9 May 2004) to have 
the developing countries have the “Doha Round for free” meaning that they will not be expected to 
implement the agreements on tariﬀ  reductions in the on-going multilateral trade negotiations. If this 
proposal is accepted and forms part of the Doha Round agreement, then the architecture of the EPAs will 
have to change from what the CPA expects them to be.
4 Th e GTAP methodology will need to be complemented by partial equilibrium analysis, particularly 
with regard to revenue implications of the EPAs. Several studies that have looked at this issue of the 
EPAs to date have tended to employ the partial equilibrium methodology (see Morrissey et al.; Tekere 
and Ndlela 2003). 
5 See Henri-Bernard Solignac Lecomte: “ Eﬀ ectiveness of Developing country participation in ACP-EU 
negotiations”.
6 ACP countries’ share of the EU market declined from 6.7% in 1976 to 3% in 1998, and still about 60% 
of total exports are concentrated in only 10 products. Source: http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/
body/cotonou/overview_en.htm#Heading1
7 See San Bilal and Kathleen Vn Hove: “An overview of the ACP-EU negotiations: issues and timeframe”, 
ECDPM, CTA international seminar, November 2002.
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8 See http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/cotonou/lome_history_en.htm
9 See Bilal and Van Hove, op. cit.
10 See Ben Hammouda: “Afrique: pour un nouveau contrat de Développement”. L’Harmattan, 1999.
11 * COM(96)570 ﬁ nal of 20 November 1996 “Green Paper on relations between the European union 
and the ACP countries on the eve of the 21st century - challenges and options for a new partnership”.
12 See Sanoussi Bilal: « Les aspects multilatéraux des accords de partenariat économique entre les pays 
ACP et l’Union Européenne ». ODI, ECDPM, May 2002.
13 Th is Waiver was granted by other WTO members on the basis that the period until 2008 would be 
used for negotiations of WTO compatible trade arrangements between the ACP countries and the EU.
14 Art. 36.1 of the Cotonou agreements stipulates that the parties will seek to “ conclude new World Trade 
Organization (WTO) compatible trading agreements, removing progressively barriers to trade between 
them and enhancing cooperation in all areas relevant to trade”.
15 See “assessing Regional Integration in Africa”{
16 At the introduction of COMESA FTA, there were serious concerns about the loss of government 
revenue. Two years after the FTA came into force for the signed up countries, there was no evidence to 
suggest that countries in the FTA had experienced revenue loss as a result. Th e study cites the examples 
of Uganda, Kenya and Zambia.
17 At the time of the study under review, the issue of geographical conﬁ guration for the SSA countries 
had not been concluded. Some of the countries included in that study have since decided to negotiate 
for EPAs under the ESA grouping.
18 Consider the case of COMESA and SADC. In both RECs, there is no common external tariﬀ . Th erefore, 
current suppliers from COMESA into SADC are likely to be displaced by EU either post-EU-ESA or 
post-SADC-EU EPAs. Th is would undermine eﬀ orts to rationalise the integration of COMESA and 
SADC.
19 Th e ORANI model is one of the early general equilibrium models that have come to be known 
as Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models. Th e CGE models have been credited with the 
operationalization of the abstract Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model. Th e ORANI model applied 
the Johansen procedure that was ﬁ rst applied by the Norwegian economist to ﬁ nd the solution for 
Norway’s ﬁ rst CGE model (Johansen 1960). Since the Johansen solution procedure, other mathematical 
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numerical methods have been integrated to the solution algorithms for general equilibrium modelling to 
the extent that non-linear models have become part of the wide class of CGE models.
20 Chapter 2 of what has come to be popularly known as the GTAP Book covers the economic theory of 
the GTAP model.
21 A composite region is an aggregation of diﬀ erent countries whose individual disaggregation has not be 
done in the GTAP database e.g. rest of sub-Sahara Africa is an aggregation of all African countries that 
are not available in the database as stand-alones.
22 As indicated in Brockmeier (2001), according to a Cobb-Douglas per capita utility function, the 
regional income is distributed over the three forms of ﬁ nal demand: private household expenditures; 
government expenditures; and savings. But the constancy of this proportionality between the three may 
sometimes not be maintained because of the endogenous nature of the private expenditure through its 
non-homothetic function. Th e price of the private household expenditure ends up depending on the 
quantities purchased and as a result of this endogeneity of the private household’s optimisation problem; 
the shares in the resultant demand equations cease to be constant.
23 Th e simulations conducted in this study use version 5.4 of the GTAP database, which is not very 
diﬀ erent from Version 5 apart from the level of disaggregation, and a few improvements. However, 
Version 6 of GTAP database that is yet to be made available does away with the aggregation rest of the 
world that is then replaced with composite aggregates for diﬀ erent geographical regions.
24 Th e simulations for the EPA analysis are done at an aggregated continental level but to understand the 
data, an exposition is done using disaggregated African countries included in the GTAP database.
25 In the GTAP version 5 database, the recently EU acceding countries were either presently individually as 
in the case of Poland and Hungary or as members of the composite Rest of Central European Association. 
In this study’s aggregation scheme, the new EU-10 is aggregated with original EU-15 to an expanded 
region EU.
26 It is possible to disaggregate the sectors of industries further especially if one is concerned with more 
details of which sub-sectors gain or lose from trade liberalization.
27 Th e proportion of industrial exports for Zambia appears overstated.
28 As seen in the introductory part of this study, deeper regional integration through elimination of intra-
African tariﬀ  and non-tariﬀ  barriers is one of the principles of the EPAs. It is therefore possible that at 
the negotiations that the African countries could commit to reducing tariﬀ  barriers among themselves as 
part of receiving non-reciprocation commitment from the EU.
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29 Th e transport and insurance costs are not reﬂ ected in the equation explicitly. 
30 Th e elasticity of import demand is 
31 As emphasized in Laird and Yeats (1986), in the case of pre-existing level of imports, there is no net 
welfare gain in the country as the tariﬀ  reduction simply means a reallocation/transfer of revenue from 
the government to the consumers.
32 Th e following sectors were found to be the most important with regards to China’s accession to the 
WTO on the basis of the tariﬀ  rates currently applied on Chinese goods: animal products, clothing, low 
and medium technology industrial goods in the case of sub-Saharan Africa; cereals and low technology 
goods into ROW; cereals, other natural resources and medium technology goods into North America; 
other natural resources, low and medium technology goods into Japan; and low and medium technology 
goods into the enlarged European Union.
33 Due to failure for GTAP version 5.4 database to fully reﬂ ect preferences African countries enjoy in the 
EU market, results from this simulation may be understated in the sense that the rate of reduction is not 
as would be the case had tariﬀ s faced by SSA countries been zero.
34 Th e free trade area between the EU and SSA is presented as an alternative scenario in case the negotiations 
eventually aim for an FTA rather than what is currently perceived as the objective to establish partnerships 
that are not necessarily FTAs.
35 Ideally, due to the mix of LDCs and non-LDCs among the SSA countries, an asymmetrical intra-
Africa trade liberalization would be more realistic. However, due to the data aggregation and the limited 
number of individual SSA countries disaggregation in the GTAP database, we were unable to capture this 
asymmetry arrangement where all the least-developed SSA countries would have full market access in the 
non-least developed SSA countries. Th e latter would face some level of protection in the least-developed 
SSA countries.
36 Th e macroeconomic closure in the GTAP scenarios discussed here allows the supply for unskilled 
labour to be endogenous by ﬁ xing the nominal wage for the same labour category. Th e endowment 
change creating a positive impact on welfare is in this case associated to the endogenous unskilled labour 
rather than the other factors of production
